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lAbstract
This article discusses the political and theological ends to which the thesis of different
“recensions” of the Bhagavadgītā were put in light of recent work on the search for an
“original” Gītā (Adluri, Vishwa and Joydeep Bagchee, 2014, The Nay Science: A History of
German Indology; Adluri, Vishwa and Joydeep Bagchee, 2016a, Paradigm Lost: The
Application of the Historical-Critical Method to the Bhagavad Gītā). F. Otto Schrader in
1930 argued that the “Kashmir recension” of the Bhagavadgītā represented an older
and more authentic tradition of the Gītā than the vulgate text (1930, 8, 10). In reviews
of Schrader’s work, Franklin Edgerton (Journal of the American Oriental Society 52: 68–75,
1932) and S. K. Belvalkar (New Indian Antiquary 2: 211–51, 1939a) both thought that the
balance of probabilities was rather on the side of the vulgate. In a trenchant critique,
Edgerton took up Schrader’s main arguments for the originality of the variant readings
or extra verses of the Kashmir version (2.5, 11; 6.7; 1.7; 3.2; 5.21; 18.8; 6.16; 7.18; 11.40, 44;
13.4; 17.23; 18.50, 78) and dismissed them out of hand (1932, 75). Edgerton’s
assessment was reinforced by Belvalkar, who included a survey of various other
“versions” of the Gītā in existence, either by hearsay or imitation. Belvalkar was
especially hostile to the possibility of a Kashmir recension, because, as he noted, “once
Schrader’s thesis is accepted as proved, it raises the possibility of other recensions of
the Poem being current at different times in different parts of India” (1939a, 212).
Belvalkar was consequent in following this assessment in the Critical Edition of the
Bhagavadgītā, and the text reprinted there is essentially that of Śan· kara’s eighth-century
commentary. Yet, the publication of the Critical Edition has not sufficed to end the
controversy, as witnessed by the latest spate of works (Vedavyas, E, 1990, Ancient
Bhagavad Gita: Original Text of 745 verses, with Critical Introduction) (Bhattacharjya, Sunil
Kumar, 2013, The Original Bhagavadgītā. Complete with 745 Verses) that claim to have
discovered the “original” Gītā. In light of these attempts, we raise the question: why is
there such interest in identifying versions of the text at variance from the normative
one? And why do Indologists, in the name of “critical” scholarship, continue to
welcome the creation of apocryphal versions of Indian texts? We suggest that there is a
historical link between German Indology’s emphasis on creating new texts and German
Protestantism.
For of playing the master and the critic there is nowadays neither measure nor end.
—Martin Luther, Luthers Bibelübersetzung (1530)
Introduction
In this paper, we reconsider the debate over “recensions” of the Bhagavadgītā in light of
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gavadgītā—reconstructed by him on the basis of an incomplete manuscript in Śāradā
characters1 and a single Gītā commentary, the Sarvatobhadra of Rājanaka Rāmakavi (a. k.
a. Rāmakaṇṭha)2 —represented an older and more authentic tradition of the Gītā than the
vulgate text (Schrader 1930, 8 and 10). In spite of criticisms of Schrader’s thesis by both
Edgerton and Belvalkar and in spite of the completion of the Critical Edition of the Bhag-
avadgītā in 1947, confusion over the normative form of the Bhagavadgītā continues, as
witnessed by the latest spate of works (Vedavyas 1990; Bhattacharjya 2013) that claim to
have discovered the “original” Gītā.3 Scholars’ confidence in being able to identify a more
“original” Gītā, whether an expanded or an abridged version of the one currently norma-
tive in India, seems not to have died. As all such efforts go back to the view that there
were different recensions of the Gītā in existence, it seems worthwhile to revisit the ques-
tion: is there a Kashmir recension of the Bhagavadgītā? And what might the existence of
such a recension reveal about the textual history of the Bhagavadgītā?
Rumors of a Hidden Gītā
Reports of the discovery of a longer recension of the Bhagavadgītā, corresponding
exactly to the length of 745 verses mentioned in the Gītāmāna (112*4), in 1917 stimu-
lated great excitement over the possibility that there might be versions of the Bhagavad-
gītā that differed from the normative version of the text (that is, that found in Śan· kara’s
commentary, which, at least since the eighth century, has been the recognized version
of the text). This suspicion (that is, that there might be versions of the Gītā other than
the one most widely read and recognized in India) directly triggered F. Otto Schrader’s
efforts at identifying a different version of the Gītā.5 In his “Neues über die Bhagavadgītā”
of 1927 (Schrader 1927, 171–83), Schrader stated that the information of the Gītāmāna
“simply cannot mean anything else than that the composer of these verses attributed to
Vaiśampāyana had before him a different version of the Bhagavadgītā than that currently
found in the Mahābhārata [and] that this other Gītā was older” (172; Schrader’s em-
phasis). He further claimed that “it now appears that that this Bhagavadgītā of 745
verses [that is, as recorded in the Gītāmāna] (or a reconstruction thereof?) is still avail-
able. At least, such a Gītā text is at the basis of the colossal Gītā-bhāṣya of the Haṃsayogin
currently being published, which is being edited by Pandit K. T. Sreenivasachariar in Ma-
dras and of which so far two volumes have been published: the Upodghāta (310 pages) and
the commentary on the first adhyāya (170 pages)” (172). A year later, Schrader also com-
mented: “The reigning view since Schlegel that the Bhagavadgītā has been transmitted per-
fectly uniformly (“nulla codicum discrepantia”) is a misconception. Thus far, it is possible
to demonstrate the existence of two versions of the Bhagavadgītā that differ significantly
from the familiar one [that is, the text of the Śāṅkarabhāṣya]: the first, namely, the one
commented on by the Haṃsayogin, due to its unique sequence of verses and the inclusion
of other verses of the Mahābhārata; the other due to a large number of unique readings,
besides several verses not attested anywhere else” (Schrader 1928, 97). Schrader added: “Re-
ferring to his article in the Garbe Festschrift [for the first], the speaker [that is, Schrader]
presented a provisory description of the second on the basis of the Gītārthasaṃgraha of
Abhinavagupta and via reference to a second Kashmiri Gītā commentary, that of
Rāmakaṇṭha (MS in the India Office), which he hopes to examine in London” (97).
Thereafter, Schrader carried out significant work on this text in numerous articles
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revealed much about the textual history of the Bhagavadgītā and its dissemination and re-
ception in northern India (Schrader 1930; 1931, 748–53; 1933, 40–51; 1934, 348–57;
1935a, 146–49).6 But before we look at these claims, let us first look at the Bhagavadgītā
edition of the Haṁsayogin, as published by the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala.
A Gītā edited from secret manuscripts?
The edition that Schrader in his 1927 and 1928 articles placed so much trust in did not
stand under a lucky star. In 1917, the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala of Mylapore, Madras, an
organization founded in 19157 and associated with the Theosophical Society, published an
edition of the Bhagavadgītā that was to be the first of several publications claiming to be
based on old, obscure, and secret manuscripts. Titled Bhagavad-Geeta of Bhagavan Sri
Kṛishna and the Geeṭarṭha-Sangraha of Maharshi Gôbila, the edition was edited by
“Pandit K. T. Sreenivasachariar of Madras” and featured an English foreword by
“Dr. Sir S. Subrahmanya Iyer, K. C. I. E., L. L. D.” Sir Subramania was one of the
leading intellects of the Anglicized Indian community of Madras and one of only
three Indian lawyers to make it to the High Court Bench. Born in Madurai district
in 1842, he rose, by 1899, to be Acting Chief Justice of the Madras High Court
and Vice-Chancellor of the Madras University in 1904. But, as Derrett notes, “dur-
ing his tenure as a Judge it was known that his real interests lay in spiritual mat-
ters. Immediately after retirement, he joined the Theosophical Society as Vice-
President. He was by that time an L. L. D., and had been gazetted K. C. I. E. Sir
Subramania Iyer was one of the first figures in Madras and it was an honour for
the Theosophical Society to have him so highly placed between 1907 and 1911. Dr.
Annie Besant thought so highly of him that she continued to publish matter of his
writing even when it ceased fully to agree with her own notions” (Derrett 1977, 178).
In his foreword to the text, Sir Subramania noted that the edition of the Gītā published
by the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala was “in a very real and substantial sense, a new one.” It
was based on “trac[ing] and duly incorporat[ing]” the “seventy and odd verses, which
ought to form part of the Scripture” by “transpos[ing] them to their proper place in the
Geeṭā” from its “parent work, the Mahâbhâraṭa,” “thereby making it what it was in the
Bhâraṭa of twenty-four thousand ślôkas, the predecessor of the epic as we have it now”
(Iyer 1917, i). However, this was not the extent of the edition’s innovation: rather, the Gītā
had been rearranged into “twenty-six chapters adopted in accordance” with the commen-
tary of one “Hamsa-yôgi,” as dictated in the latter’s commentary known as the “Khaṇda-
rahasya.” “This commentary,” Sir Subramania claimed, “hitherto little known outside the
ancient Organization called the Śuḍḍha-ḍharṃa-maṇdala is a veritable store-house of in-
valuable interpretations of the secret teachings, contained in some of the most important
Āryan sacred books such as parts of the Vêḍa, a number of the Upanishaḍs, the Mahâ-
bhârata, the Râmâyaṇa and a few of the Purâṇas” (ii). Immediately thereafter, however, he
noted that “the name Hamsa-yôgi is not the name of a specific individual author but that
of an aḍhikâra-purusha, who is a member of the occult hierarchy engaged in the spiritual
government of our globe, and who is charged with the duty of furnishing to the world eso-
teric explanations of scriptural teachings from time to time” (ii). In the conclusion, and
perhaps not without a certain contradiction with his preceding statement about the cre-
ation of the edition, he noted of the sources consulted for the edition:
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many years ago from the manuscript of Svâmi Yôgânanḍa who is evincing much
interest in the publication of this and other works hitherto known only to the
members of the Śuḍḍha-ḍharma-maṇdala to which he belongs. The Editor’s said
copy has been carefully compared with two others lent to him by Svâmis
Śankarânanḍa and Bhavânanḍa, both of whom are also members of the said
organization. Furthermore, all the manuscripts have been checked with reference to
a palm-leaf hand-book, nearly a century old, containing the first few words of all the
verses of the Geeṭa in the order in which they stand in the present edition. This
handbook belonged to the Editor’s maternal grandfather, Ṭiruvêlunḍoor Bhâshyam
Ṭiruvênkatâ Châriar, an erudite and versatile paṇdit, a friend and relation of Para-
vasţu Rangâ Châriar, the greatest Samskṛṭ scholar of his time in this Presidency and
the author of a remarkable Samskṛṭ lexicon. (xxxv–xxxvii)
In contrast, “the manuscript of Gôbhila’s Kârikâ used by the editor was kindly lent to
him by one of the Svâmis occupying a very high position in the Organization. It will
thus be seen that much care has been taken in making the present edition accurate and
reliable, and it is hoped that it will have a wide circulation” (xxxvii).
Sir Subramania’s comments about the origins of the edition stand in contrast with
the editor’s, who notes that “the existence of this Geeṭa of the Śuḍḍhas was first discov-
ered to me by my much revered grand-father; who, as has long been well-known, was a
staunch adherent of Śuḍḍha Dharma. My grand-father was Sremaḍubhaya Bāshyam
Thiruvenkatachariar of Tiruvinḍalur. For his own use, he had once prepared an index
of the first quarters of the verses of the Bhagavaḍ-Geeṭa, under the guidance of which,
and from the manuscripts of the Swāmi Yōgānanḍa, Śankarānanḍa and Bhavānanḍa,
has this Geeṭa been edited” (Srinivasachariar 1917, 21), and in complete contradiction
to the comments of R. Vasudeva Row, the translator of the edition, according to whom
publisher and editor, Sir Subramania and Pandit Sreenivasachariar, had been “enabled
to do so [that is, publish the edition] by some of the Elders of the Suddha Dharma Man-
dalam, who graciously secured for the purpose of the Manuscript of this Text,
along with those of other philosophic works, in Their safe keeping, from the archives of
Suddha Kosha in the Maha Guha [great cave] in Northern India, known to a few among
us” (Row 1939, vii). These discrepancies, both between the different accounts of the ori-
gins of the text and also within individual accounts, suggest a less scrupulous ancestry for
the edition, and, in fact, Derrett has speculated that the “‘Haṃsa Yogi’ was the Madras
pandit himself” (Derrett 1977, 179). There are also problems with the way the text
of the Bhagavadgītā has been compiled, which clearly presupposes later ideas and
modes of scholarship, especially historicist and critical scholarship. But before we
evaluate the bona fides of the edition, let us first take a look at the arrangement of
the materials itself and its contents.
The theosophic Gītā of the Haṁsayogin
Although Sir Subramania and K. T. Sreenivasachariar both claimed that the text of the
Bhagavadgītā in the edition was based on ancient manuscript(s), it is clear that the
actual arrangement of the text deferred not to a manuscript containing the text but to
a manuscript of the Haṁsayogin’s commentary. For, Sir Subramania explicitly declared
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into twenty-six chapters adopted in accordance with Hamsa-yôgi’s commentary known
as the Khaṇda-rahaysa” (Iyer 1917, ii). Even if this commentary turned out to be based
on an actual manuscript of a traditional commentator—something we have every rea-
son to doubt—it is clear that the arrangement of the edition itself was novel in the
sense of being reconstructed to reflect and to bring out the principles of Śuddha
Dharma philosophy. In fact, publisher and editor both acknowledged as much: Sir
Subramania noted that “those, who have so long been accustomed to the division of
the book into eighteen chapters, will naturally demand an explanation of the present
division into twenty-four chapters, now for the first time made publicly known” (Iyer
1917, ii); and Sreenivasachariar noted: “concerning the twenty-four Geeṭas it contains,
Gōbhila, speaking on the Āḍiparva of the Mahābhāraṭa, says ‘Pravriṭṭi Dharma or the
Dharma of Forthgoing involves the Taṭvas; likewise, Taṭvas mark Nivriṭṭi Dharma or
the Dharma of returning also. The ten senses, the five material elements, the ṭanmāṭras
or the properties of the atoms of these elements, Mula-prakṛṭi or the element of the
monad or Āṭman, Mahaṭ, the element of intuition, Manasa or the mind and Ahankāra
or the I-concept—these are known as the Taṭvas. These twenty-four Taṭvas are also the
theme of the Bhagavaḍ-Geeṭa” (Srinivasachariar 1917, 2). In fact, the entire undertaking
was an attempt to create a new, authoritative text—new, because it had to address a
contemporary audience and because Sir Subramania was interested in pursuing a pro-
gram of national spiritual renewal—even though to gain that authority it had to embed
itself in the tradition, indeed, claim that it was not new at all but represented an ancient
and timeless tradition. Hence, Sreenivasachariar could claim:
Such is the Geeṭa which the Śuḍḍhas hold up and revere and it consists of twenty-
six chapters; it is made up of as many geeṭas (twenty-four) as there are letters in the
Gāyaṭri, each letter of which signifies one Taṭva or element. Reckoning up the verses,
the Geeṭa contains seven hundred and forty-five stanzas. We say seven hundred and
forty-five stanzas on the authority of the Mahābhārata itself which in the last chapter
of the Geeṭa-parvan incorporated in the Bheeshma-parva, says, ‘The Lord, Kṛishṇa,
spoke six hundred and twenty stanzas; Arjuna spoke fifty-seven; Sanjaya, sixty-seven;
and Dhṛṭarāshtra, one. These together make the Geeṭa’. (2)
Figure 1 (on the following page) presents the actual arrangement of the chapters of
the Śuddha Dharma Gītā.
Without entering into extensive detail about these chapters, let us here convey a
sense of just how closely their arrangement is shaped by theosophic ideals. The best
way to do so is again to quote from Rajagopala Iyengar’s translation of the pandit’s pref-
ace to the text. He writes:
The Geeṭa of the Śuḍḍas consists of the following chapters: On the coming or the
genesis of the Geeṭa. On Nara and Nārāyaṇa; on avatars or incarnations; on
heirarchs [sic]; on the instruction of hierarchs in the due arts; on the knowledge of
causes; on beatitude; on the nature and characteristics of those engaged in the study
and practice of the teachings of the group of the foregoing six chapters; on the
securing by these men, of the three instruments or means of the method of
Fig. 1 List of Chapters and their Titles in the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala Gītā (Row 1939, x)
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Mōksha or liberation, which gives Prāpṭi or the attainment of the higher for those
who have learnt this Māya; on the aspect and nature of Brahman adored by those
aspirants after liberation; on Nara and Nārāyaṇa who, with their sinless volition, have
the power of assuming manifold forms; on the method of Prāṇāyāma, which is the
emblem of the concentrated activity in those that study and practise the teachings of
this second group of six chapters; on the Supreme Self, the object to be realised by
those aspirants; on Akshara or the spirit, veiling itself in the Cosmos; on the study of
this aspect of the spirit; on the office and function of the Paramahamsas; on Sanyāsa
or renunciation; on the self, the causer of yōga, for the aspirants who study and
practise the teaching of this third group of six chapters; on Prakriṭi or the Not-self,
on related details and particulars; on knowledge and the method of knowledge; on
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ters lead to; and finally, the hymn on the realisation of Brahman. (Srinivasachariar
1917, 15–16)
Pandit Sreenivasachariar’s Gītā was, however, not only theosophical in respect to its
contents but also in respect to several ideas concerning history, the relation of texts to
the community, and the appearance of a savior. But as these ideas are best examined
when we discuss the peculiar historical and social conditions under which this and
several other expanded Gītās were produced in the twentieth century, we shall discuss
them there.
The Kashmir Gītā of F. Otto Schrader
The Haṁsayogin’s Gītā is not read today and is widely considered to be a fake. But its
historical significance ought not to be underestimated, chiefly in the way it inspired
other scholars to also search for different recensions of the Bhagavadgītā. Here, we wish
to focus on one such example: the Kashmir Gītā of F. Otto Schrader. As we have seen,
in his search for an expanded version of the Bhagavadgītā, Schrader set out from this
very edition as evidence for the fact that the Bhagavadgītā as found in the vulgate had
not always been the normative version of the Bhagavadgītā. Thus he cited Edgerton’s
assertion that “there is absolutely no documentary evidence that any other form of the
Gītā than that which we have was ever known in India. This, of course, does not prove
that none ever was known; but it leaves a strong burden of proof upon those who
maintain such a theory.”8 Against Edgerton, he argued: “one does not need to search
far for the proof demanded by Edgerton. It is found, namely, in the Mahābhārata itself
in the chapter immediately following the Bhagavadgītā.” Thereafter, citing the Gītāmāna
śloka, he stated: “What does this mean? It simply cannot mean anything else than that
the composer of these verses attributed to Vaiśampāyana had before him a different
version of the Bhagavadgītā than that currently found in the Mahābhārata. Further, it
also suggests the hypothesis that this other Gītā was older and that therefore not only
the round verse number 700 but also the chapter number 18 according with the num-
ber of books of the Mahābhārata of the Gītā found in the current Mahābhārata is the
result of a revision” (Schrader 1927, 172; Schrader’s emphasis). In pursuit of this
thesis, Schrader first turned to a reconstruction of the Haṁsayogin’s Gītā on the
basis of the introduction and the commentary on the first adhyāya, which is surpris-
ing since, as we have seen, both these contain sufficient clues to suggest that the edi-
tion was a bogus work9; evidently Schrader was not sufficiently skeptical of the
Haṁsayogin’s efforts or did not take the publisher’s and editor’s introductions with
the seriousness they merited.10 Thereafter, in later works, he turned to a reconstruction
of the version of the Bhagavadgītā he considered to have been current in Kashmir.
As this second of our bogus Gītās is of more interest to us here, we shall resume the
story with Schrader’s arguments for a “Kashmir recension” of the Bhagavadgītā.
In 1928, Schrader followed up his introduction of the Gītā of the Haṁsayogin
with a presentation at the Deutscher Orientalistentag in Bonn where he gave a
presentation on the transmission of the Bhagavadgītā. In this presentation, whose
transcript is unfortunately not preserved to us but of which we have a small notice
in the report of that meeting, he presented, as he put it, “a provisory description
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ence to a second Kashmiri Gītā commentary, that of Rāmakaṇṭha (MS in the India
Office), which he hopes to examine in London” (Schrader 1928, xcvii). He further
noted that “the use of this manuscript in Germany for the purpose of an extensive
publication about the Kashmir recension of the Bhagavadgītā has, in the meantime,
been generously granted him; it contains the text almost completely.” Further, “in
the British Museum he [the speaker, that is, Schrader] found an incomplete birch
bark manuscript, not as yet listed in the published catalogue, containing only the
text (in Śāradā script), which appears to agree exactly with that of the commentary
cited” (xcvii). These were to be the basis of his next work, a reconstruction of the
“Kashmir recension” of the Bhagavadgītā, published in 1930.
Schrader’s reconstruction was based on the evidence of three sources: two commentar-
ies and a single fragmentary manuscript containing only the text of the Gītā (up to chapter
8, verse 18). The commentaries in question were the Sarvatobhadra of Ramakaṇṭha, used
from manuscript no. 3271 in the library of the India Office, London, while the
Bhagavadgītārthasaṁgraha of Abhinavagupta was used from the edition of the Nirnaya Sagar
Press of 1912. According to Schrader, “all three sources are to some extent vitiated by the in-
fluence of the vulgate.” “This is most patent in the MS of the Sarvatobhadra where often the
text preceding the commentary is in conflict with the latter [that is, the commentary],” but it
also seems to have affected the other two sources, for “in the edition of Abhinavagupta’s
commentary the vulgate has here and there crept not only into the pratīkas but even into the
commentary itself, though, fortunately, without creating any doubt as to A.’s reading. And in
the birch-bark MS the influence of the vulgate is quite obvious, e.g., in its containing two
verses of the vulgate (II, 66–67) missing in both commentaries, and in its giving twice stanza
V, 19 (ihaiva tair jitaḥ sargo, etc.) of the vulgate, viz., in that place and, moreover, after VI,
9, i.e., the place where the commentaries have it” (Schrader 1930, 2). In constituting his
“Kashmir recension,” Schrader provided a list of the Kashmiri variants where the text of his
sources differed from that of the vulgate. In places where his Kashmiri sources were not
unanimous, he printed both readings next to each other, without making any attempt to recon-
cile them or, indeed, reduce them to a common one. As a sample, we provide the first chap-
ter11 from his text of the Bhagavadgītā (23–24):
1.1a dharmakṣetre kurukṣetre sarvakṣattrasamāgame (samavetā yuyutsavaḥ)12
1.7c nāyakān mama sainyasya saṁjñārthaṁ tān bravīmi te (nāyakā)
1.8a bhavān bhīṣmaś ca karṇaś ca kṛpaś śalyo jayadrathaḥ (samitiṁjayaḥ)
1.8c aśvatthāmā vikarṇaś ca saumadattiś ca vīryavān (saumadattis tathaiva ca)
1.9c nānāśastrapraharaṇāḥ nānāyuddhaviśāradāḥ (sarve yuddhaviśāradāḥ)
1.11a ayaneṣu tu sarveṣu yathābhāgam avasthitāḥ (ca)
1.18a pāñcālas ca maheśvāso draupadeyāś ca pañcake (drupado draupadeyāś ca
sarvaśaḥ pṛthivīpate)
1.21c ubhayos senayor madhye rathaṁ sthāpaya me ’cyuta (senayor ubhayor madhye)
1.24c ubhayos senayor madhye sthāpayitvā rathottamam (senayor ubhayor madhye)
1.28a kṛpayā parayāviṣṭo sīdamano ’bravīd idam (viṣīdann idam abravīt)
1.29a sīdanti sarvagātrāṇi mukhaṁ ca pariśuṣyati (mama gātrāṇi)
1.30a sraṁsate gāṇḍīvaṁ hastāt tvak caiva paridahyate (gāṇḍīvaṁ sraṁsate hastāt)
1.32a na kāṅkṣe vijayaṁ kṛṣṇa na rājyaṁ na sukhāni ca (na ca rājyaṁ sukhāni ca)
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prāṇāṁs tyaktvā dhanāni ca)
1.35c api trailokyarājyasya hetoḥ kiṁ u mahīkṛte (nu)
1.37a tasmān nārhā vayaṁ hantuṁ dhārtarāṣṭrān svabāndhavān (sabāndhavān)
1.39c kulakṣayakṛtaṁ doṣaṁ saṁpaśyadbhir janārdana (prapaśyadbhir)
1.47c utsṛjya saśaraṁ cāpaṁ śokasaṁvignamānasaḥ (visṛjya)
As can be seen, the differences are not very significant13 and Belvalkar, in fact,
thought that they were the kind that could easily be explained through the normal
processes of scribal error, gloss, and simplification of the text. According to him,
the majority of the 282 Kashmiri variae lectiones could be classified into one of
four types:
1. “The Kashmirian variants (with a sporadic exception or two) seek to remedy and
regularize the grammatical defects of the current (or Śāṁkara) text” (for
example, 2.50ab, 2.60a, 3.23a, 5.1 cd, 6.39a, 7.18b, 9.31c, 10.9d, 11.41b, 14.23d,
16.2c, 16.13b) (Belvalkar 1947a, lxxviii).
2. “The Kashmirian variants seek to simplify and normalize the syntax” (for example,
1.7c, 5.21b, 6.13c, 6.19d, 6.21a, 8.17b, 9.11d, 10.16b, 10.19b, 10.28c, 11.44d, 18.8a,
18.50ab) (lxxix).
3. “The Kashmirian variants generally tend to smoothen (not always successfully) the
difficulties in interpretation that have proved troublesome” (for example, 1.33b,
2.43b, 2.61b, 6.7b, 6.28b, 13.4d, 13.16a, 17.13a, 17.23c) (lxxx).
4. Finally, of four variants to which Schrader attached particular significance (2.5c,
2.11ab, and 2.21d), Belvalkar noted that all four of them were lectiones faciliores,
and that Schrader had misinterpreted the manuscript evidence (lxxxii).14
Belvalkar also argued with compelling evidence from the other Mahābhārata manu-
scripts collated for the Critical Edition that the variants in Schrader’s three sources did
not justify the assumption of an independent Kashmiri tradition, significantly different
from the text of Śan· kara. According to him, the variation was within the limits of that
found in the other manuscripts; further, Schrader’s sources were not even unanimous
among themselves. “It is to be noted that in the 282 places where Schrader reports
Kashmirian varietas lectionis it is not always the case that his three Kashmirian au-
thorities agree; and in such cases the discrepancies are explained as due to the influ-
ence of the Vulgate reading” (Belvalkar 1939a, 213). Further, Schrader’s three sources
did not find support even from the Kashmiri manuscripts collated for the Critical
Edition of the Mahābhārata, as one might expect if there really had been an independ-
ent tradition of the Bhagavadgītā in Kashmir. “One expects that our Kashmirian Mss.
would confirm Schrader’s findings, and in a few cases they no doubt do so. But is it
not rather surprising that in as many as 122 places (Vide Appendix 1) the Kashmirian
and allied-Kashmirian Mss. used for the Critical Edition should not support the variant
readings listed by Schrader? None of the other Mss. also, even in a single one of these
122 cases, registers Schrader’s readings, while in 12 other cases, shown in Supplements
to Appendix 1, the ‘Kashmirian’ readings find only sporadic support from solitary
Mss.” (213).
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Śāradā MS records over 130 cases of such individual variations unknown to Schrader’s
sources or in fact practically to any other MS.” He concluded that “we would not be
justified in attaching any exaggerated importance to these cases of solitary variants, in-
dividually or cumulatively, and raise them to an independent ‘Recension’” (213).
Indeed, Belvalkar found that “even in the matter of the additional stanzas and half-
stanzas (as also of the omissions),” which had been Schrader’s strongest reasons for
insisting on the existence of an independent tradition, “the Kashmirian Recension is
not by any means peculiar” (215). He showed that other manuscripts also frequently
added stanzas or half-stanzas as well as omitting some, but there was no reason to
doubt the authenticity of the vulgate recension. Further, in his assessment, Schrader
had rather overstated the evidence for an independent “Kashmir recension.” “Schrader
designates the consensus of his three sources by the symbol ‘K,’ but that is rather
misleading because his MS Lb breaks off after viii.18, and because Abhinavagupta
passes over many words of the text in silence, so that not infrequently ‘K’ denotes only
one authority” (215). The readings of Schrader’s sources did not have widespread
support from other sources from Kashmir, making it more likely that the variants were
cases of scribal error and corruption in one, isolated source that had been handed
down and become the basis for the two commentaries.15 Indeed, some of the read-
ings were not unique to Schrader’s sources at all, but had the support of other
manuscripts,16 so that the editor chose those readings over those of the vulgate for
the Critical Edition; others, by contrast, were clearly due to errors that could have
occurred independently.17 Summing up, Belvalkar noted: “a large number of his
[Schrader’s] cases are merely solitary variations of individual Mss., while quite a
few of the others are not peculiar to Kashmir, and have no probative value in es-
tablishing a ‘Kashmirian recension’. About a little over thirty per cent. of the cases
adduced can be regarded as Kashmirian Pāṭhabhedas of the Gītā, but intrinsically
they can almost all be proved to be secondary and posterior to the text of the
poem as known to Śaṅkarācārya” (231). He therefore rejected Schrader’s claims re-
garding the “authenticity” and “priority” of the Kashmir recension (231).18
The difficulty with the Lectio Difficilior
Belvalkar’s careful sifting of the evidence was confirmed by Franklin Edgerton, who
wrote in a review of Schrader’s book that, after a careful study of Schrader’s variants,
he had been “forced to the conclusion that not one of them is conclusive” and “in a
number of cases, on the contrary, the probabilities favor the vulgate reading, while in
the remaining there seems hardly any reason to prefer” (Edgerton 1932, 70). Edgerton
also disputed Schrader’s assertion that the stanzas of the vulgate omitted in his sources
must be “secondary additions” because “they ‘cannot possibly have been omitted in K
for want of interest or some such reason.’” He wrote that Schrader “attributes more
care and system to ancient Hindu copyists and redactors than I should wish to, when
he implies that the stanzas could not have been omitted in K by mere accident, or
(which perhaps means the same thing) for some reason that escapes our ken” (74–75).
In contrast, he claimed that the extra verses in the Kashmiri sources had to be seen as
additions in them, rather than as conscious omissions in the vulgate: “Is there any
reason to suppose that they [the three-line stanzas] would have appeared to an ancient
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the ancient Indian past. It is much more likely that the extra lines of K are secondary
additions” (75). Edgerton also examined in detail a number of variant readings (in
verses 2.5, 11; 6.7; 1.7; 3.2; 5.21; 18.8; 6.16; 7.18; 11.40, 44; 13.4; 17.23; 18.50, 78) that
Schrader had asserted were more original than the vulgate readings; in all cases, he
rejected Schrader’s readings as being more likely the lectiones faciliores. His conclusion
was succinct and decisively stated:
In brief, I see no reason whatever for assuming the originality of any of the plus
parts of K, nor of even a single one of K’s variant readings. I am obliged to conclude
that the attempt to prove the superiority of K is a failure, and that, on grounds of
general probability, we must continue to regard the vulgate text of the Gītā as the
nearest approach we have to the original, especially since it seems to be supported
by the genuine ‘Kashmirian’ version of the Mahābhārata as a whole. (75)
A complete evaluation of Schrader’s claims is only possible by re-examining all his
sources and comparing these with the editor’s decisions in the Critical Edition.
The problem, however, with arguing from the lectio difficilior is that it is often subject
to challenge. In many cases, opinion will differ upon which reading will have appeared
more obvious to a scribe. Except in cases where one of the forms is truly rare or one is
orthographically easily mistaken for another, more complex form, determining the lec-
tio difficilior often comes down to a matter of weighing the probabilities. A headstrong
editor, then, will quite often be able to controvert his critics’ objections, as Schrader, in
fact, did vis-à-vis Edgerton. (By contrast, he never responded to Belvalkar’s evaluation
of the evidence, either after 1939 or 1947, perhaps because Belvalkar did not argue
solely from the lectio difficilior, but also presented extensive additional evidence show-
ing that Schrader’s alleged “Kashmir” readings were neither as unique nor as unusual
as he thought.) Thus, Schrader noted that “fourteen whole verses and four half-verses
of the Kashmir Recension are missing in the vulgate. Edgerton considers them all to be
interpolated, apparently for no other reason than that the vulgate does not contain
them. However, factual reasons appear to me to speak against not a single one of these
verses; but a precise metrical examination of the Bhagavadgītā (also worthwhile for
itself ) could perhaps also identify interpolations here, perhaps also the Schallanalyse
[sound analysis?]. [But] it must for now remain non liquet [that is, without an applic-
able law or a decision deriving therefrom]” (Schrader 1933, 43). Further, he rejected
Edgerton’s arguments for preferring the vulgate reading aśocyān anvaśocas tvaṁ praj-
ñāvādāṁś ca bhāṣase over the Kashmiri aśocyān anuśocaṁs tvaṁ prājñavan nābhib-
hāṣase (2.11), with the words: “I [that is, Schrader] see here in V a very old corruption
(Speijer expressed this view already in 1902 in his article “Ein alter Fehler in der
Überlieferung der Bhagavadgītā” in ZDMG vol. 56) and in K the original reading. The
meaning according to Edgerton is: ‘. . . and you (presume to) utter speeches concerning
wisdom! (altho you are so foolish as to mourn those who should not be mourned)’.
This is not very different from the four of the native explanations I have listed, namely
that of Śrīdhara’s (prajñāvatāṃ paṇḍitānāṃ vādān śabdān kathaṃ Bhīṣmam ahaṃ
saṃkhye ityādīn kevalaṃ bhāṣase na tu paṇḍito ’si), but, for me, even less acceptable
than it. For the ‘presume to’ that one must think in addition is a far too dubious
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reading of V, because it is supposedly the lectio difficilior. A lectio difficilior is often
based on a mere corruption of the text: anuśocaṃs (K), through leaving out the anus-
varā, became anuśocas and further anvaśocas; and, as a consequence, the impulse for
changing it arose, since one now needed a ca or tu in the second pāda” (45).
Schrader also contested Edgerton’s reasons for preferring the vulgate reading hat-
vārthakāmāṁs tu gurūn ihaiva over the Kashmiri na tv arthakāmas tu gurun niha-
tya,19 on the grounds that “Edgerton translates: ‘but having slain my gurus as they seek
to attain their ends, I should eat food smeared with blood right in this world (without
waiting for such a punishment in a future life)’ and adds, by way of clarification, that
Arjuna means ‘a guru’s wish should be law to him.’ But as the latter is self-evident to
every Hindu, one must ask oneself how it is that this simplest of explanations of the
verse did not occur to any of the commentators. This can, in my view, only be the case
if arthakāma was not familiar to them in the sense stipulated by Edgerton (‘desiring
their ends’), but only as a fixed composite with the two meanings that are alone
attested of ‘avaricious’ and ‘obliging.’ I therefore hold on to the Kashmiri reading artha-
kāmas” (Schrader 1933, 45–46). Regarding verse 6.7, Edgerton had argued that the
terms ātman and paramātam were often treated as synonymous and so there was no
real reason for objecting to the vulgate’s jitātmanaḥ praśāntasya paramātmā samāhi-
taḥ.20 Schrader responded huffily: “regarding the Bhagavadgītā’s reluctance to treat God
and the soul as two separate metaphysical principles, I have expressed myself often
enough (e.g., in my introduction to Bhagavadgītā XIII in Religionsgeschichtliches
Lesebuch, issue 14, p. 20); Edgerton’s lecture on this subject was unnecessary” (Schrader
1933, 46). He further claimed that “the reason for it [that is, paramātman] had now
become clear to me: not because it was ‘precisely equivalent to ātman’ [as Edgerton
had claimed], but rather, in order to express the contrast to the ātman in jitātmanaḥ
(which was concealed in the words yenātmaivātmanā jitaḥ of the preceding verse) the
author this time says paramātma. He namely had the idea of two ‘selves’: the lower,
which is falsely called so and the true self, here paramātman, simply called ātman in
the previous verse (just like the lower)” (46; emphasis in original). Nonetheless, he
rejected Edgerton’s conclusion: “even so the verse remains suspicious in the vulgate
form. For the word paramātman not only does not appear in the older Upaniṣads but
also in the so-called middle Upaniṣads that immediately precede the Gītā and have
been cited word for word by it (Īśa, Kaṭha, etc.) and in the Gītā it first appears, ignoring
our verse [that is, 6.7], in the additions that begin (according to Oldenberg’s and
Garbe’s and also my opinion) with adhyāya XIII” (46). Finally, Schrader also contested
Edgerton’s interpretations of 3.2,21 6.16,22 7.18,23 9.40,24 11.44,25 13.4,26 17.23,27 and
18.78,28 granting only four as open to question (that is, 1.7,29 5.21 and 18.8,30 and
18.5031).
Stemmatic arguments for K?
The lectio difficilior is an established principle in textual criticism and, when used cor-
rectly, it can in fact lead to the restoration of better, that is, unusual and presumably more
archaic readings, only its use can so often be controverted in practice by a determined op-
ponent that it is not always as useful as it might be. Especially in the case of German
scholars, who saw no role for themselves in Sanskrit Studies if they were not to controvert
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problems. Since German Indologists were precisely interested in putting their little know-
ledge of Sanskrit on display, drawing them into a discussion of the merits of different
readings—or, being drawn by them into a discussion of the merits of different readings—-
played inescapably into their hands.32 They could now put on display their philology,
which, as Heyne remarked, consisted of nothing more than “the vanity of wanting to seem
brilliant through emendations.”33 (Heyne, in contrast to the German Indologists, was ex-
tremely circumspect about replacing the accepted reading34; the Indologists might have
taken a page out of his book and evolved a more mature, less shrill philology.) For this
reason, we focus here on stemmatic arguments for evaluating proposed reconstructions.
This emphasis arises not from a rejection of the lectio difficilior, which has been used to
great effect in the Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata—in fact, there is very little disagree-
ment about it when scholars have a shared commitment to the truth (Belvalkar’s and
Edgerton’s assessment of the vulgate is an example of the concord possible when using
the lectio difficilior as the criterion), but from an awareness that the Indologists’ Achilles’
heel is textual criticism. We shall focus here on Schrader’s arguments for a “Kashmir re-
cension,” as he is especially vulnerable on stemmatic grounds.
Even assuming that the Kashmir recension represents an independent, parallel
text of the Bhagavadgītā and even assuming that it was the older recension (as
compared with the vulgate), how are we to imagine its transmission? Schrader dis-
cusses the question in three places: his 1930 study, his 1933 article, and his 1938
article. In the 1930 text, Schrader argued that there must have been several recen-
sions of the Bhagavadgītā in circulation to judge by the testimony of Al-Biruni.
Further, as “not one of the additional stanzas [in the Kashmir recension]” appeared
to be “unmistakably an interpolation” (Schrader 1930, 10; emphasis in original)
(though he did not rule out the possibility, indeed, he considered it “quite likely,”
“that there are additions in K (such as V, 17 in the birch-bark MS.)” [10]), he con-
cluded that “at least some of the additional matter of K, as compared with V, may
have been in the original Gītā before the number of its stanzas was cut down to
seven hundred” (10). In contrast, he argued that the verses missing in the Kashmir
recension (2.66 and 2.67) must have been additions in the vulgate: “they were not
in the original Gītā” (11), and hence, while both recensions had undergone
changes, the Kashmir recension had to be seen as preserving more of the original.
Although Edgerton, in his review of Schrader’s book, pointed out a major flaw in
this argument (the excellent and old manuscript no. 2137 of the India Office Li-
brary, London contains the vulgate version of the Gītā creating, in Edgerton’s
words, “a certain presumption in favor of the vulgate text” [Edgerton 1932, 70]),
Schrader held on to his theory, though now offering a more complicated account
of the relation of all three recensions (that is, the “original,” the vulgate, and the
Kashmiri). (Note, however, that Schrader’s objection to Edgerton’s argument, “this
[that is, that Edgerton considered none of the readings of K to be more original
than the corresponding ones of V] would mean that in Kashmir the recension V
developed at some point into K and was then later once again replaced by V”
(Schrader 1933, 42) is nonsense, entailing as it does a petitio principii.) Thus, he
now argued that “if we therefore assume that the text of K has undergone changes—and
this is surely most probable—and accordingly eliminate the obvious corrections and
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foundation of K, that can be considered a parallel text to the vulgate, i.e., as a text that,
together with this [the vulgate], goes back to an original that has not been preserved
or that has not been found as yet” (42–43).
This interpretation was tantalizing as it provided support for the German
scholars’ thesis of a much shorter “original” Gītā, later revised by “Brahmanic” re-
dactors (and, in fact, Schrader did argue, immediately after presenting this idea,
that “for the contemporary discipline [Wissenschaft] there can only be the one
‘working hypothesis’ that the text of the Bhagavadgītā was not always fixed, but ra-
ther was first [fixed] from the period onwards in which the vulgate, through the
spread of Viṣṇuism all over India, which took place relatively late, compelled its
universal acceptance” [43; Schrader’s emphasis]), but it crucially failed to take into
account the evidence of the Gītāmāna śloka—something we know, from Schrader’s
other writings, that he was explicitly interested in. Thus, in his final article on the
topic, Schrader took a different tack: he now argued that even if the original Gītā
had been a much shorter work, it must have developed into the present recensions
(that is, the vulgate and the Kashmiri) via a 745-verse Gītā, for, “however late that
passage [that is, the Gītāmāna] may be, the Bhagavadgītā to which it refers must
be older and may be even considerably older, and those ślokas must have been
composed by one who had actually before him a Bhagavadgītā of that description”
(Schrader 1938, 62). On the basis of this hypothesis, he now essayed the view that
“at a time when the Bhagavadgītā was not yet as sacrosanct as it has been since
more than a millennium this same Bhagavadgītā as we now have it” must have
been “re-written with some additions and omissions” (62–63). The additions re-
quired to bring the number of verses up from an indeterminate, but definitely
lower figure35 to 745 presented no problem, for, as Schrader argued, “we can well
imagine that the revisor added bona fide to, or interpolated in, the speeches of Śrī
Kṛṣṇa some more stanzas of the Lord’s known to him from other sources. We can
also understand that he saw no harm in adding, where this appeared to be desir-
able to him for the sake of clearness or otherwise, some ślokas (borrowed or of his
own making) to those spoken by Saṁjaya” (63; Schrader’s emphasis). However, the
omissions, required to bring the number of verses spoken by Arjuna down from
eighty-four in the present Gītā (that is, the vulgate) to the fifty-seven noted in the
Gītāmāna śloka presented a greater problem. According to Schrader, it was inconceiv-
able that, once present in and recognized as a genuine part of the Bhagavadgītā,
these verses could have been removed by any author. “We can, however, not understand
his omitting any ślokas of the present Gītā. For, what could have induced him to do so?”
(63; Schrader’s emphasis). Hence, he concluded: “No other conclusion can be drawn from
this consideration but that those 27 ślokas exceeding in the current Gītā the number of
those spoken by Arjuna in the longer one were not known to the compiler of the latter,
and thus the supposition that he had before him our present Gītā falls to the ground” (63;
Schrader’s emphasis). In order to bring the number of verses spoken by Arjuna in the
Bhagavadgītā in line with the Gītāmāna figures, he therefore proposed excising verses
1–2, 15–30, and 36–44 of chapter eleven, which gave him a “Gītā” of 673 ślokas, from
which he again subtracted two ślokas (because a variant in a Kashmiri manuscript refers
to the number of verses spoken by Arjuna as fifty-five rather than fifty-seven) to arrive at
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the most original Gītā, the product of the German scholars’ fantasy), he reversed course
and argued,
we [now] get a glimpse of the gradual growth of the Gītā from an unknown stage or
number of stages to 671 stanzas (i.e., the vulgate minus 29 stanzas of Arjuna’s) and,
from that point, in two diverging lines viz., (1) to a Gītā of 698 stanzas, i.e., 671
increased by 27 of Arjuna’s and then, by means of two more stanzas attributed to
him, to the 700 stanzas of the vulgate; and, on the other hand, (2) to 741 stanzas, i.e.,
the vulgate minus 29 stanzas of Arjuna’s and plus 70 stanzas, not contained in the
vulgate, of Śrī Kṛṣṇa’s and Saṁjaya’s, and from here, viz. by adding from the
complete vulgate 2 more stanzas of Arjuna’s and besides 2 more stanzas of Saṁjaya’s
to the 745 stanzas of Vaiśampāyana’s Gītā. (66)
On the basis of this two-stage analysis (first stage: using the evidence of the Gītāmāna
śloka; second stage: using the evidence of the Gītāmāna śloka in a Kashmiri variant),
Schrader concluded: “if this is what has happened, then not 27 but 29 ślokas spoken by
Arjuna have to be accounted for as missing in the original Gītā, and the two latest ones
would have to be either XI, 1–2, or VIII, 1–2, or two of the group X, 12–16, say 12 and
13” (66–67).36Schrader as a textual critic and a critic of the Gītā
The problem with Schrader’s claims, however, is that they are not really stemmatic, as
becomes apparent once we draw up explicit stemmata in place of his implicit ones
(see Fig. 2 below).
In the first case, if the scribes of K and V made conscious changes in each of their
exemplars while copying from their common ancestor O, there is no stemmatic way to
judge the originality of the readings of either K or V. The standard assumption in textual
criticism is that scribes copy everything in their source and more, that is, that while they
may introduce unconscious errors and insert glosses or even entire lines, they never con-
sciously omit anything (Reynolds and Wilson 2013). If, however, the scribes of K and V
were to have both added and omitted materials, we would be unable to account for the
original reading in all the cases where K and V differ. Further, if K itself were to contain a
number of interpolations vis-à-vis O, there would be no way of judging which of its four-
teen full and four half-verses is original: any of these could be the interpolated verses.37Fig. 2 Schrader’s Hypothetical Stemmata
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Likewise, his second argument assumes that we can, in the absence of stemmatic
means, identify which of these fourteen full and four half-verses is original. Belvalkar
and Edgerton had both pointed out of his original argument that, in the case of a crux
between K and V, the balance of probabilities was wholly on the side of V—that is, that
the additional verses in K were more likely additions in this recension rather than
omissions in the vulgate. Schrader, however, thought he could get around this objection
by conceding that some of the verses in K might be unoriginal and still maintain the pri-
macy of the “Kashmir recension.” Thus he now argued that K could have developed from
K' through the addition of a certain number (y) of verses, but K' would still be more ori-
ginal than V if V had developed from O also through the addition of a certain number (y)
of verses. In this way, while he would have taken the force out of Belvalkar’s and Edger-
ton’s objections (by casting doubt on the authenticity of the verses of V itself ), he would
still have retained K as the superior recension, albeit not in the form of K itself as it was
present to him in his two and one-half sources but in the form of a hypothetical ancestor
of K called K' to be reconstructed through eliminating the excess verses in K.
The problem with this argument, however, is that in the absence of a manuscript for
comparison, there is no way Schrader can get from K to K': at most he could arbitrarily
eliminate a number of verses, but the resulting text would not necessarily be more original
than K—he would only be assuming that it was so. Further, if, as he explicitly claimed, V
attained its present extent of 700 verses through the addition of y verses, then the original
O must have contained less than 700 verses.39 If K' contains 714 full and four half-verses
less y verses (that is, the total number of verses in K less those verses Schrader acknowl-
edged might be interpolations in K [signified here by the symbol y]), then the fourteen full
and four half-verses less y verses not found in V could be features of O only if some of the
other verses in K' were additions in it. Consequently, Schrader would again have to go
through K' and identify which verses were original in it and which not. The regress from K
to K' does not solve anything; it only shifts the difficulty up one level.40 Schrader thus finds
himself once again in the situation of using subjective criteria to determine the original
form of the Bhagavadgītā—an undertaking as precarious as it is pointless.
Finally, the third of Schrader’s arguments for a “K” recension is the worst. From
the disparity in accounts between the Kashmiri version of the Gītāmāna śloka,
reported by S. N. Tadpatrikar (Tadpatrikar 1937, 357, n.1),41 and the vulgate ver-
sion42 of that śloka, he concluded that the Bhagavadgītā must have been expanded
in two stages: (1) a first stage, in which were added twenty-seven additional ślokas
spoken by Arjuna, giving rise to the Kashmiri version of the Gītāmāna śloka
(which attributes fifty-five ślokas to Arjuna); and (2) a second stage, in which were
added an additional two ślokas spoken by Arjuna, giving rise to the vulgate version
of the Gītāmāna śloka (which attributes fifty-seven ślokas to Arjuna). Schrader is
obviously presuming that the two scribes or the scribes of the two versions had ac-
cess to the same manuscript or text, except that one gained access to it at a later
date, after it had undergone a further stage of expansion. But this is not true!
There is no evidence that the scribe of V is reporting on the same text, albeit in
expanded form, as the scribe of K. Both might be reporting on independent tradi-
tions, that is, that the relation of the two instead of being:
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Or, the scribe of one may simply have erred in his count (or erred in writing sevenfor five).
Schrader further compounds his error by crossing this first misconception (that is,
entering the two texts “reconstructed” on the basis of the testimony43 of the Gītāmāna
śloka one below the other) with a second misconception: although both versions of the
śloka speak of an expanded Gītā of either 741 or 745 verses, he treats their information
as applicable to the vulgate Gītā as well, and thus enters V alongside K44 into his
stemma to yield a bipartite stemma with expansion of both branches in two stages.
Exactly where Schrader is getting the idea that the Bhagavadgītā must have been ex-
panded “from an unknown stage or number of stages to 671 stanzas (i.e., the vulgate
minus 29 stanzas of Arjuna’s)” (Schrader 1938, 66; Schrader’s italics) is unclear since
the Gītāmāna śloka does not speak of the vulgate having less verses. It is clear that
Schrader is trying to square the testimony of this śloka with the evidence of the vulgate
text, and since the only way he can square the fact that the Gītāmāna śloka’s figures are
both simultaneously greater and lesser than the vulgate’s (greater in the total number
of verses; lesser in the number of verses attributed to Arjuna), the only way he can do
so is to treat the two as two separate operations performed on a common ancestor.45
Unfortunately, from the fact that a śloka refers to a Gītā with twenty-nine verses less
spoken by Arjuna than in the version we possess, the only thing that we may conclude
is that such a Gītā may have existed and not that our version is related to this Gītā by
the addition of twenty-nine verses to a common core. For we do not know what the
fifty-seven verses spoken by Arjuna in that other Gītā may have been: they may have
been completely different verses or they may have included some of the ones we now
try to identify as the “additions” in our Gītā, which is to say that Schrader’s calculations,
carried out at such length and with every indication of profundity and respect for
the learned views of his peers Richard Garbe, Moriz Winternitz, and Rudolf Otto,
are worse than useless. Likewise, his projected bipartite stemma, though carried
out with every intent of making a contribution to the “textual criticism” of the
Bhagavadgītā, is pointless.46 Schrader has not understood the basics of how to
work with manuscripts or how to reconstruct manuscript traditions and that he
has intervened so massively in the Bhagavadgītā tradition, leading to confusions
about the extent of the text that persist to this day,47 illustrates just how baleful
the import of German “critical” methods into native scholarship has been for the
textual transmission of Indian texts.48
Reconstructing the past using projected texts
The fragmentary and misleading nature of Schrader’s evidence49 makes a more com-
prehensive evaluation of his claims impossible at the present juncture,50 though it has
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in common with Sir Subramania’s efforts than we might like to concede. Thus, in the
three remaining sections of this paper, we wish to draw attention to certain parallels
between Schrader’s work and the efforts of Sir Subramania (or, as we like to call them, the
Hamburg yogin and the Haṁsayogin [see Fig. 3]). These sections will also offer an inter-
esting perspective on the sociology of the human sciences, especially “Indology.”
Schrader’s claims about the Bhagavadgītā were not restricted to merely identifying a
slightly different text. Rather, this new text—even though, as we have just seen, the
evidence for it was tenuous and the text itself unremarkable—became the basis for
wide-ranging claims about Indian antiquity—claims that had direct consequences for
indigenous intellectual and “religious” traditions. We first quote some of these claims,
cited in order of their appearance.
Even before he had seen the London manuscripts (or any manuscripts whatsoever),
Schrader had already staked out a position on the original extent of the Gītā, in con-
formity with German scholars’ views of the poem. Thus, in a 1910 article (Schrader
1910, 336–40), his earliest article on the Bhagavadgītā, he opined: “I am, completely in
agreement with Garbe, of the view that the Bhagavadgītā has not always been the uni-
form and contradiction-free whole, as which it has since an indeterminate (and prob-
ably indeterminable) era been regarded universally in India; rather, [I am of the view]
that it emerged through the expansion and possibly revision of an originally smaller
work” (340). Even though he did not have any evidence on which to base these asser-
tions, Schrader claimed: “here [in the Gītā] the later, viṣṇuistic version had been pre-
ceded by an earlier, unsectarian (“purāṇic”) version” (340). He also claimed that “the
oldest Gītā as part of the pre-viṣṇuite Mahābhārata was already at an end with [verse]
II, 38 (naivaṃ pāpam avāpsyasi)” (340). He followed this claim up in his 1927 essay
with the assertion that “[the Haṁsayogin’s] fantastic statements at any rate show—
something that was until now unknown and contested among us—that the idea of earl-
ier and shorter versions of the Bhagavadgītā is present even in India” (Schrader 1927,
178; Schrader’s emphasis). In his 1930 publication, Schrader wrote, “the conclusion to
be drawn from all this [namely, that his two commentaries did not refer to the vulgateFig. 3 The Haṁsayogin and the Hamburg yogin: Sir Subramania Iyer and Friedrich Otto Schrader
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Kashmir by the end of the tenth century” (Schrader 1930, 8; Schrader’s emphasis). He
added: “And hence it further follows that no commentary based on the vulgate can up
to that time have been known in Kashmir, i.e., that the Gītā Bhāṣya attributed to
Śankarācārya and for this reason believed to be the oldest Gītā commentary preserved
to us was likewise unknown there [that is, in Kashmir] up to that time at least”
(8; Schrader’s emphasis). Further, casting doubt on the authenticity of the Śāṅkarabhāṣya,
he wrote, “but how is it that apparently neither the name of Śaṅkara nor any unmistakable
reference to his system is found in Abhinavagupta’s works or those of his predecessors?
Can the reason be that in Kashmir (as an ancient stronghold of Buddhism) Śaṅkara’s
system was not looked at as something sufficiently original to require a special
refutation?” (8–9).
The years 1931 to 1935 saw the publication of three further articles on the subject,
with Schrader by now established as the reigning specialist on the Bhagavadgītā. Thus,
in the first of these, “The Bhagavad-Gītā in Ancient Kashmir,” he wrote: “the existence
of a Kashmirian recension of the Bhagavad-Gītā became first known to me when I
found that in the great Abhinavagupta’s ‘Epitome of the Gītā’ (Gītārthasaṁgraha) some
verses are explained which are missing in the vulgate. I then found in London the
materials which enabled me to edit the text. Thus, every stanza besides those of the
first book being repeated in the Sarvatobhadra, the complete text could be restored by
me” (Schrader 1931, 748–49). In contrast to his earlier study, however, where he had
argued for the originality of the “Kashmir recension,” he now disputed the authenticity
of both versions: “now the discovery that the Gītā text commented on by Śaṅkarācārya,
Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc., was preceded in Kashmir by a text diverging from it in about
three hundred places naturally raises the question of which of the two texts is the
original Gītā. The most likely answer I have to this question is: Neither. There are
features in both versions which appear to be unoriginal. The inevitable conclusion,
then, seems to be that we are so far not in possession of the original of the Bhagavad-Gītā,
but only of two not very different recensions of it” (749).
Schrader’s next article focused on expanding these “historical” details. Against
Edgerton (who had pointed out that, contrary to Schrader’s thesis of a “Kashmir recen-
sion,” the Kashmirian manuscripts examined by the editors for the Critical Edition,
including the old and excellent manuscript no. 2137, did not contain the Kashmiri but
the vulgate text), he argued that an examination of the same manuscript had shown
that it had “traces of the Kashmirian recension such as na tv arthakāmas tu instead of
hatvārthakāmāṁs tu (II, 5), omission of II, 67–68a-b, and many others.” He argued
that “this is a confirmation of my claim that the suppression of the Kashmirian recen-
sion by the vulgate took place gradually: the traces mentioned are the last of a struggle
[between the recensions] that is manifest not only in the separate manuscripts of the
Gītā, in Gītā commentaries and quotations but also, naturally, affected the entire
Mahābhārata tradition” (Schrader 1933, 41–42). He added: “With Śaṅkara’s triumph, the
vulgate also triumphed in Kashmir and only it [that is, the vulgate] was copied except for
in circles of the orthodox [altgläubig], which grew ever smaller” (42). Schrader appears to
have been absolutely convinced of this thesis’s correctness, for he claimed: “the absence of
the vulgate [text] in the Kashmiri Mahābhārata as well will be attested to by every manu-
script from that period that may still come to light (to my knowledge, until now not a
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firm [to the thesis] that in approximately the ninth to the eleventh centuries in Kashmir
the sole recognized or—more probably—sole known text of the Bhagavadgītā is the one
edited by me” (42).51 Schrader also criticized Edgerton’s thesis that the “Kashmir recen-
sion,” due to its greater extent and its more classical Sanskrit forms, was more likely a
modern, corrected and expanded copy of the text. According to him, “this would then
mean that in Kashmir the recension V once developed into K and later was then once
again replaced by V. But so far we know nothing of an earlier existence of V in Kash-
mir [the same thing could be said, with equal justification of Schrader’s K; in fact, the
argument is circular, because it presumes that K became the standard recension in
Kashmir such that it would need to be “replaced” by V]; and by far the largest number
of the 250 cases in which K diverges from V do not permit a decision regarding
greater originality, whereas in over 30 cases, in my view, the probability of greater an-
tiquity lies on the side of K” (42). In fact, as in his 1931 article, Schrader used doubts
about the correct reading to cast doubt on the authenticity of both versions. Thus he
averred that “If we therefore assume that the text of K has undergone changes—and
this is surely most probable—and accordingly eliminate the obvious corrections and
the verses that appear to be added from it [that is, from K], we arrive at a text as the
foundation of K, that can be considered a parallel text to the vulgate, i.e., as a text
that, together with this [the vulgate], goes back to an original that has not been pre-
served or that has not been found as yet. For the contemporary discipline [Wissen-
schaft] there can only be the one ‘working hypothesis’ that the text of the
Bhagavadgītā was not always fixed, but rather was first [fixed] from the period on-
wards in which the vulgate, through the spread of Viṣṇuism all over India, which took
place relatively late, compelled its universal acceptance” (42–43; Schrader’s emphasis).
Schrader’s final article in this series also returned to the theme of multiple recensions
of the Bhagavadgītā, though now he linked it up with European searches for the “Ur-
Gītā” since Wilhelm von Humboldt. According to Schrader, the figure cited in the
Gītāmāna (745 verses, of which 620 are attributed to Kṛṣṇa, fifty-seven to Arjuna, sixty-
seven to Saṁjaya, and one to Dhṛtarāṣṭra) could be explained through a combination of
additional verses existing in an older source or sources (thus bringing up the total to
745, including forty-six additional verses for Kṛṣṇa and twenty-six for Saṁjaya) and in-
terpolations in the current Gītā (responsible for bringing the total for Arjuna to
twenty-seven in excess of the Gītāmāna figure). According to him, from the fact that
no scribe or editor could have wished to omit verses once they were regarded as part of
the Gītā, even those attributed to Arjuna, “it can mean nothing less than that those 27
ślokas, since they were missing but cannot have been omitted in Vaiśampāyana’s Gītā
must be a later addition to the original Gītā, no matter whether the latter itself is only
a later recension truer to the original than those known to us was the basis of the Gītā
of 745 ślokas referred to in the summary” (1938, 63; Schrader’s italics). He continued:
“that there are interpolations in the Bhagavadgītā was noticed as soon as it became
known in Europe, viz., by the great Wilhelm von Humboldt who found it difficult to be-
lieve that the last seven adhyāyas up to XVIII 62 are an original part of the Gītā” (63;
Schrader’s italics) and then presented a summary of European scholarship up to his
day.52 In concord with a broad tradition of scholarship that has always had its problems
with the eleventh chapter, the theophany of the viśvarūpa, Schrader argued that “it is
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XI. For, this most admired canto of the Bhagavadgītā is on account of its highly im-
aginative character specially favourable to enlargement, and of the two cantos contain-
ing many ślokas spoken by Arjuna (viz., [chapter] I with 21 and XI with 33) it is the
one where a fairly large number thereof can be spared. Not much is lost and the con-
text is not disturbed if we omit stanzas 1 and 2, 15 to 30, and 36 to 44. This gives us
exactly twenty-seven stanzas, it being remarkable that apparently not one more can be
spared in the adhyāya in Arjuna’s speeches” (64; Schrader’s emphasis).53 At the end of
these and still more complex operations, Schrader concluded that the Bhagavadgītā
“riddle” (he means the fact that the Gītāmāna śloka refers to a text of 745 verses)
“reveals by its very form the existence of two recensions of the Bhagavadgītā, to wit:
one which was longer than the two known to us (the vulgate and the Kashmirian one)
and one which was shorter and therefore, at least as regards the eleventh canto, more
original than both of the two. There has been, as I said, since W. v. Humboldt’s days
the persistent persuasion among Western scholars, shared also by some in India, that
the original Bhagavadgītā must have been shorter than the current one” (Schrader
1938, 67; italics and emphasis Schrader’s).54
Sources of philological authority
We will not address further here Schrader’s claims for an “original” Gītā, as enough has
been written on this subject elsewhere.55 Rather, we want to draw attention to the way
in which the creation, indeed, just the mere suggestion, of a new text is enough to
transfer philological and epistemic authority over the text from one set of guardians
and interpreters to another. This is a phenomenon that can be observed very well in
the case of Schrader’s “Kashmir recension.” Although his manuscript evidence was thin
(in reality, he had done no more than found scribal variants in one manuscript, and
possibly two commentaries that had been based on this text, that is, an ancestor of or a
manuscript similar to this one), Schrader was able to leverage the ensuing uncertainty
over the text to a position of authority. The editors of the journal The Aryan Path,56
for instance, introduced his essay with the words, “This paper embodies the substance
of Dr. Schrader’s recent researches on the Gita together with some new ideas, and also,
for the first time, a translation of the stanzas preserved in Kashmir only” (Schrader
1931, 748).57 Setting out from the hypothesis of a different version current in Kashmir
(a hypothesis that was not even remotely proven by his sources), he developed this hy-
pothesis into an expansive account of why the Bhagavadgītā, as read and transmitted in
India for centuries, was neither the most ancient nor the most authentic. Not only was
he able to challenge the normative form of the text, as it had been read and interpreted
by Indian commentators for centuries but he was also able to rehabilitate western
scholars’ theories of an “original” Gītā by arguing from the variation between the two
recensions (a variation that can be quite satisfactorily explained in terms of the minute
changes that are introduced each time a text is copied) that they must both have
descended from an original different from the versions of all the commentators. Schrader
did not explain how far back he placed this original or, indeed, if he identified this
source with the text hypothesized by him as the “original” Gītā (that is, up to 2.38) or
merely with a somewhat less expansive version of the text, but it is clear that, once
this possibility was granted, there was no real reason to stop with the hypothetical
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Ur-Gītā) could be admitted.58 Further, invoking a standard trope of the Indologists,59
Schrader argued that “the Kashmir recension was in ancient times the only Bhagavad-
Gita existing in Kashmir, until, as late as about the eleventh century AD, it was ousted
by the vulgate when the latter was introduced in that country together with the works of
Śaṅkarācārya” (749; Schrader’s emphasis). Indeed, he developed this claim into a theory of
a full-blown sectarian conflict in Kashmir, in which the traditional Gītā of the Pratyabhijñā
school was replaced by the vulgate. According to him, the text of his sources itself
revealed traces of “the last of a struggle [between the recensions] that is manifest not only
in the separate manuscripts of the Gītā, in Gītā commentaries and quotations but also,
naturally, affected the entire Mahābhārata tradition” (Schrader 1933, 41–42). Even though
these traces can be much more easily and naturally explained through the normal means
of contamination (for example, comparison of manuscripts, occurrence of variant read-
ings in the margins or marginal glosses, absorption of these variants or glosses into the
text), Schrader argued for a real historical event and a real consonance between the fea-
tures he believed he could see in the text and this hypothetical event. Thus, he wrote: “with
Śaṅkara’s triumph, the vulgate also triumphed in Kashmir and only it [that is, the vulgate]
was copied except for in circles of the orthodox [altgläubig], which grew ever smaller” (60).
In his 1935 article, he further expanded on this theory, arguing that “a combination of cer-
tain facts seems, indeed, to justify the assumption that the spread of the vulgate in Kashmir
began at about the time of Yogarāja, i.e., in the twelfth century. Before this time there is
not only no trace of the vulgate text of the Gītā but also, so far as I can see, not a single in-
dubitable reference to Śaṅkara or his works. I am, therefore, inclined to believe that it was
during the reign of the Kashmirian king Harṣa (1089–1101), whose love of Dākṣiṇātya fash-
ion has been noticed by Kalhaṇa in his Rājataraṅgiṇī, that the works of Śaṅkara and his
school, and so the vulgate of the Gītā on which Śaṅkara’s Gītā-bhāṣya is based, began to at-
tract the attention of the Kashmirians” (Schrader 1935a, 148). Schrader conceded that “the
lateness of this date—over three centuries after Śaṅkara—is embarrassing” (148). But he
had an explanation ready to hand:
The dig-vijaya of Śaṅkara was very likely not nearly as complete as the traditional
accounts would make us believe. The Kashmirian ācāryas, on the other hand, were
so much engrossed in their own Śaiva darśana that they may have been practically
inaccessible to any system which did not proclaim the Āgamas as its source and
base. They were, moreover, acquainted with Buddhism, Kashmir having been its
stronghold for a long time, and must have, therefore, regarded the Śāṅkara Vedānta,
if they knew it, as what it really is: a Vedāntic adaptation from Buddhist philosophy.
As such, i.e., unoriginal and heretical, as it appeared to them, it may have been
ignored until the time when the flower of the Pratyabhijña school was over and a
ruler of the country had taken a fancy to the south. (148–49)
Spurious archaeology, fraudulent presentation of scripture, and practical
organization
Derrett has argued that the production of new, modern and yet supposedly timeless
scriptures such as those created by the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala should be seen as a
response to a unique intellectual climate, one in which Hindu scriptures, to be
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lished systems of commentary and exegesis to offer a recontextualization (of the an-
cient wisdom), that is to say, the tradition of reception had been interrupted. Under
these conditions, the only way Sir Subramania’s “yearnings for spirituality and for the
spiritual regeneration of his country” could be met were through falsification of the
documentation (Derrett 1977, 178).61 Derrett holds out the prospect of a renewal and a
restoration of these systems (“The answers are bound to come with time. The pandits
of that day will welcome a method of regulating society which will neither have a need
for the participation of complacent foreigners, nor fear to build upon the flattened rub-
ble of the latter’s ignorance, disdain, and neglect”; xv), but we, who still work under the
conditions of this immense rupture and delegitimation of the tradition, must look for
alternative ways to make sense of what has happened in history. Here we wish to offer
a commentary by way of offering a parallel.
Even though obviously a forgery,62 Sir Subramania’s edition of the Gītā should not be
seen as the sole example of a fabricated Gītā in this period. The early years of the twen-
tieth century are rife with examples of apocryphal Gītās, from the “pantheistic Gītā” of
Adolf Holtzmann Jr. to the “theistic Gītā” of Richard von Garbe, from the “epic Gītā”
of Hermann Jacobi to the “Kṛṣṇa Gītā” of Hermann Oldenberg, and from the “trinitar-
ian Gītā” of Rudolf Otto to the “Aryan Gītā” of Jakob Wilhelm Hauer.63 To these, we
could also add the “soldier’s Gītā” of Theodor Springmann, the “Brahmanic Gītā” of
Georg von Simson, and the “pseudo-German Gītā” of Mislav Ježić, not to mention the
countless other Gītās in existence, either by hearsay or by imitation including the two
most recent attempts (Vedavyas 1990 and Bhattacharjya 2013) to produce an “original”
Gītā of 745 verses (Fig. 4 clarifies the relationship of these Gītās to each other). As we
have argued in several articles, these texts must be seen as symptomatic of the peculiar
conditions of the reception of Indian texts in modernity. Western and especially
German academics had no interest in reading the texts as they were read in India
and yet they desperately wanted to be a part of their unfolding history. As a text
commentarial tradition, that is, a tradition in which the fundamental form of dia-
logue was the commentary written on the canonical works of the tradition, the
Indian tradition was particularly vulnerable to contestation of its sources. Thus, theFig. 4 An Overview of Gītā Criticism, Illustrating the Influence of Schrader’s Higher Criticism on his
Lower Criticism
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pretations were premised, something that can be done most easily by raising the
possibility of multiple and contradictory versions of the texts. Since the very sys-
tem of debate nurtured in India depends upon a shared text (though interpreta-
tions can differ), by denying such a common basis western scholars could
effectively paralyze the tradition. Further, if every text was already “sectarian” in
origin (that is, either as a whole or in its parts, each of which was attributed to a
distinct sectarian source), native scholars had every reason to mistrust the possibil-
ity of a philosophical exchange or dialogue. Thus, at the same time as they found
themselves pushed into retreat on the texts and having to secure them philologic-
ally against western scholars’ criticisms, they also found themselves unable to
restart ancient traditions of commentary. Modern scholarship had arrived in India:
the pandits and śāstris’ dialogical partners would no longer be other native scholars
with a commitment to shared principles of argumentation, evidence, and aim of
scholarship, but the western scholars themselves.
Schrader’s researches on the Bhagavadgītā, occurring as they do at the cusp of this
important period in Indian intellectual history, are revelatory of the processes at work
in this transfer of epistemic authority from the native scholars to a new class of profes-
sional guardians of Indian texts: the western-trained historical critics. They illustrate
how, by creating doubts about the normative form of the Bhagavadgītā, by highlighting
the existence of multiple recensions of the text, by arguing in terms of the “religious”
agendas and anxieties of those involved, and so on, western scholars were effectively
able to interrupt the traditional transmission of texts and the accessory sciences
required for their interpretation. Little wonder, then, that Schrader welcomed news of
the Haṁsayogin’s Gītā with open arms.64 In place of the text of the tradition, western
scholars advanced their own ideas of specialization, of critical research and of historical
reconstruction. It is characteristic that none of the texts of the Bhagavadgītā produced
in this period could get by without reference to western scholarship or western
methods: the tradition had lost its ability to self-authenticate.65 Even the Haṁsayogin,
that archetype of eastern “mystical” consciousness is a product of this new paradigm.
His work gives testimony of the advent of historical consciousness in India: he writes
that “the eventful Mahābhārata War” is a real event, having taken place “over one hun-
dred and thirty centuries” ago (Row 1939, viii); the new text along with its commentary
recommends itself over existing versions precisely in respect of “its utter catholicity
and singular freedom from sectarian and class bias of any kind whatever” (vii–viii); and
the arguments for its authenticity, peculiarly enough, are now no longer derived from
the assent of a legitimating community or even from the simple expedient of claiming
to have discovered ancient manuscripts in a secret cave, but rather, from text-critical or
historical-critical reflections of the kind that would not have appeared (and, as a matter
of fact, did not appear) unusual to Schrader.
The great men of old, high-souled protagonists of the several cults and mighty philoso-
phers, did not, in polemical argument, advance the idea of the one pure and eternal
Dharma, in which are the seeds of all faiths and creeds; since, it would not have served
to set off the sectarian doctrines they might enlarge upon, to describe alongside the
single, seminal ḍharma that is at the root of all sects and faiths and the knowledge of
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doctrines, the subtlest Truths, to the mere treatises they wrote. It must now be
abundantly clear that it is against all argument to say that the Geeṭa of the Śuḍḍhas
cannot be authentic simply because great men of the past have not referred to it, in
works mainly controversial, where they sought to confound their opponents by loudly
setting forth their own doctrines. (Srinivasachariar 1917, 9–10)66
Now, for centuries, the Geeṭa has been known to consist of only eighteen chapters;
as such indeed did the great men of yore who interpreted the Geeṭa, Śankara, and
others, together with their followers, accept it. Had they been aware of this other
Geeṭa prized by the Śuḍḍhas, would not they have made in their works at least a
single reference to it, were it only to disagree with its drift and teachings, refute and
condemn it, and thus strengthen the cause of their own doctrines they expounded?
Therefore those that rely on authoritative sources should approve of such a work as
this Geeṭa of the Śuḍḍhas. (9)67
The flow of knowledge between two cultures is always a two-way process, but, in this
case, we think the credit for teaching the Indians techniques for producing fabricated
texts rests squarely with the Germans.
Conclusion
We began this paper with a quote from Luther as a segue; let us now draw everything
together. Even though Roman Catholic versions of the Bible are themselves not free of
interpolations and glosses, perhaps no translator of the Bible was ever as wanton and
unapologetic about his changes to the text as Luther, as recorded in his famous
exchange with Emser in 1530.68 In fact, as Luther makes clear in this exchange, the aim
of his translation is not to restore a more original reading, but, through introducing the
possibility of differing interpretations of the same text, to contest the traditional author-
ity of the church.69 But Luther was aware that once the possibility of contesting the
meaning of the received text is admitted there is no end to the process, and that is why
in the very next line following this line, that is, after the line “for of playing the master
and the critic there is nowadays neither measure nor end,” he added: “And let every
man be warned against other copies [that is, other than his own].” In other words, he
saw that the question of the correct reading ultimately comes to an end only with a de-
cision in favor of one text over another: it is a question of which text one finally recog-
nizes as authoritative. The introduction of the possibility of different readings of the
text, then, does not so much eliminate the question of authority as it serves, rather, to
create a fluxing configuration out of which a new authority may arise.70 In a similar
vein, when German Indologists from the nineteenth century onwards contested the
normative form of the Bhagavadgītā, they did so not in order to arrive at a more stable,
more accurate reading of the text (one clearly does not enhance confidence in a text by
casting doubt on its readings) but precisely to create a situation of uncertainty, in
which established authorities might be discarded for new ones. By massively destabiliz-
ing the transmission of the text (as Luther in his time before them had done with the
Bible), Indologists created a different source of intellectual and institutional authority,
and thus what they did was political through and through. At the latest when a reader
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one.71 Thus, she will not trouble too much whether the reading is hatvārthakāmāṁs tu
gurūn ihaiva or na tv arthakāmas tu gurun nihatya. As long as both yield an accept-
able sense, she will select one, because she is ultimately interested in using the text
for self-reflection and self-transformation, that is to say, in an ethical relation. It is
only the Protestant who, thinking he is saved sola fide (by faith alone), can endure in
the face of an infinity of readings. But this infinity is a bad infinity. It indicates the
apotheosis of subjectivity, but a subjectivity dirempt of all humanity, even in the
minimal form of a concern for the self. It is an empty placeholder, even though the
academic and critic may pride himself, thinking he is superior to the “naïve” reader,
who always makes a choice when reading the text. Hovering between damnation and
faith, the Indologist, like Luther, cannot choose, or, rather, he chooses not to choose,
thus keeping faith open as a possibility. Pasquali’s words, “with regard to recensio,
philologia profana is still, without knowing it, a tributary of philologia sacra,”72 thus
still hold true, even if perhaps in a sense different from the one the author originally
intended.Endnotes
1No. 6763 D; British Museum, London.
2No. 3271; India Office Library, London. Schrader also used a second Gītā com-
mentary, the Bhagavadgītārthasaṁgraha of Abhinavagupta, but as he did not have ac-
cess to the manuscripts for it (he cited it according to the Nirnaya Sagar Press edition
of 1912), we have not counted it here.
3Some of this is, of course, rehashed, as, for example, Brockington’s introduction
(2015) to the recent Norton edition of the Bhagavadgītā (Flood 2015). But the question
still remains: why has scholarship not penetrated beyond the original purposes for
which it was created? (Brockington’s arguments against the originality of the Bhagavad-
gītā, discussed in Brockington 1998, are addressed in Adluri and Bagchee 2016a.)
4ṣaṭ śatāni saviṁśāni ślokānāṁ prāha keśavaḥ | arjunaḥ saptapañcāśat saptaṣaṣṭis
tu saṁjayaḥ | dhṛtarāṣṭraḥ ślokam ekaṁ gītāyā mānam ucyate | |
5Born March 19, 1876 in Hamburg, Friedrich Otto Schrader studied Indology
in Göttingen, Straßburg, and Kiel, graduating with a doctorate from Straßburg in
1902. Schrader was active in India from 1905 to 1916, where he served as the dir-
ector of the Adyar Library in Madras; he returned to Germany in 1920. From 1921
until 1945, Schrader was the Ordinarius for Indology and comparative linguistics
at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität in Kiel, where his researches focused mainly
on Buddhism, the Dravidian languages of India, and on creating general surveys of
Hinduism. Further biographic details can be found in Sprockhoff (1963a, 1–11); a
bibliography of his publications in Sprockhoff (1963b, 12–32 and 1982b, xi–xxii).
6All of Schrader’s publications on the Bhagavadgītā, with the exception of Schrader
1928, 1935a, 1935b, and 1958, are reprinted in Schrader 1982.
7The date is only approximate: no historical records appear to exist for its establish-
ment, but David and Nancy Reigle claim that “The existence of the Suddha Dharma
Mandala (Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍalam) was announced by Sir S. Subramania Iyer in the
article, ‘An Esoteric Organisation in India,’ published in 1915 in The Theosophist”
Bagchee and Adluri International Journal of Dharma Studies  (2016) 4:4 Page 27 of 41(Reigle and Reigle 2007, 3). According to Derrett, this article was actually published in four
parts in The Theosophist 36, no. 2 (1915): 407, 499, and 614 and 37, no. 1 (1915): 196–206
(Derrett 1977, 178, n. 91a). The original article is cited as Iyer 1915 in the bibliography.
8The reference is to Edgerton (1925, 99).
9Schrader’s comments on the Haṁsayogin’s Gītā and his attempts to date and
locate his work using style and vocabulary make delightful reading and are one of the best
examples of the pitfalls the western scholar falls into when he attempts to adopt a critical
tone vis-à-vis the past. For this past can quite often be bogus, a deliberate deception on
the part of those involved. The Haṁsayogin’s Gītā presents us with a case where we can
clearly see this because we have actual historical information about its dates and manner
of composition, but how many other such works must there be where the author adopted
the tone of a different historical period? Historical-critical reconstructions, the stock in
trade of the Indologist, depend upon the attribution of a tremendous naïveté and lack of
dissimulation to Indians, at the same time as the Indologist asserts that Indian accounts of
history are not to be trusted. The contradiction is unsustainable and lasts only a little lon-
ger than the Indologist’s hold on the public imagination.
10Schrader dismisses Sir Subramania’s introduction with the words “the exten-
sive, but unfortunately completely unscientific [unwissenschaftlich] introduction of
the deceased Dr. Sir Subramania Iyer” (Schrader 1927, 173, n. 1), but if he had
only seen that this was the only part of the edition that really deserved attention
and that it was the closest to a genuine treatment of the conditions of the origin
of this version. Obviously, the distinction between the “scientificity” of the German
scholar and the “unscientificity” of the native scholar is too narrow to encompass
all the possible permutations and combinations that might result. In this case, it is
the Haṁsayogin’s Gītā, which Schrader treated all unawares as genuine material to
be historically studied and determined and related (that is, to a western audience)
by him, which is clearly and definitely unscientific (and not just in the sense in
which for the Indologist all materials from India’s past are “unscientific” but in the
sense of not being a suitable object for scientific research), whereas Sir Subrama-
nia’s introduction, dismissed as “completely unscientific” by Schrader, is actually
the only available object of research here: it is this that Schrader should have stud-
ied had he wished to arrive at reliable historical conclusions.
11This is perhaps not the ideal choice, as the first chapter is not representative (the
first chapter is preserved only in the birch bark manuscript and there are no variant
readings). A discussion of Schrader’s reconstruction of the text, however, would have
exceeded the scope of this paper.
12Italicized text indicates the changes in Schrader’s sources; terms in parentheses are
the corresponding Critical Edition readings. The Critical Edition reading is the same as
the vulgate reading in all the cases cited by Schrader, except for 1.28c where the Critical
Edition reading (dṛṣṭvemān svajanān kṛṣṇa yuyutsūn samavasthitān) is exactly that given
by Schrader as the reading of his Kashmiri source (the corresponding vulgate reading, as
given by Schrader, is: dṛṣṭvemaṁ svajanaṁ kṛṣṇa yuyutsuṁ samupasthitam).
13Note that this chapter is based on the evidence of a single witness, the Kashmiri
birch bark manuscript no. 6763D (the two commentaries only make a few comments
about the first chapter), so that the readings Schrader has listed are in fact lectiones sin-
gulares and would have been eliminated as such in the process of reconstruction.
14Schrader’s reading of the evidence is rather different. He also groups the readings
into four categories, but his categories differ; and are as follows:
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of V” (for example, 1.28 cd, 2.5c, 2.43 cd, 2.51c, 3.27, 5.5, 14.24, 17.6, 2.60a).
2. “Secondly, there is a large number of readings in K which look like grammatical or
stylistic emendations of V” (for example, 3.23a, 5.24a, 9.14, 10.16, 10.19, 10.24,
11.41, 11.48, 11.54, 18.8).
3. “Thirdly, there is the rather numerous class of readings which appear to be original
readings of the Gītā preserved in K but corrupted in V” (for example, 2.5, 2.11, 6.7).
4. “The three readings I have so far dwelt on are, I believe, the most interesting ones
of all; the rest can be dealt with in a much shorter way” (1.7, 3.2, 5.21, 18.8, 8.17,
6.16, 7.18, 11.8, 11.40, 11.44, 13.4, 17.23, 18.50, 18.78, 1.7, 2.5b, 2.6d, 2.10, 2.11,
2.21, 2.35, 3.2, 3.23c, 3.31d, 3.38, 4.18d, 6.21a, 6.21d, 6.28c, 6.37a, 10.42, 11.43,
16.3b, 16.8d, 16.19, 17.13, 17.26) (Schrader 1930, 11–18; all emphasis Schrader’s).
15“A Provincial Recension of the Bhagavadgītā such as Schrader claims for Kashmir
should imply that all or nearly all Mss. hailing from that Province through direct or
indirect line of scribal transmission exhibit a sufficient number of varietas lectionis which
(a) are generally common to the group and (b) are not to be found, except sporadically, in
other groups of Mss. belonging to other Provinces. We have now seven ‘Kashmirian’
sources to deal with: 1. The London Śāradā MS used by Schrader (Lb); 2. The
Commentary of Abhinavagupta (Ca); 3. The Commentary of Rāmakavi (Cr); and 4–7 of
our Mss. which provisionally are designated Ś, K, H, and A” (Belvalkar 1939a, 214).
16“[T]he so-called Kashmirian Recension is not peculiar to [the] Kashmirian text-
tradition, but is more widely distributed, so much so that in a few cases I have
adopted it for the Critical Edition without even a wavy line underneath, and in
others with the wavy line” (215).
17“[W]hile in quite a number of other cases, although neither of the above proce-
dures was adopted, the rejected Kashmirian reading received support from such diverse
sources as to place it beyond ‘Provincialism’ and in a few cases even demanded a wavy
line below the adopted Vulgate reading” (215).
18We have not cited here Belvalkar’s distinction between a “version” and a “recen-
sion” (a “version” “embody[ing] modifications happening during the course of scribal
transmission from a common codex”; a “recension” “connot[ing] more deliberate and
far-reaching alterations in the text”; 214, n. 1), both because we do not think the
distinction is sustainable and because Belvalkar himself later abandoned the claim (see
Belvalkar 1941, 25–26).
19“Schrader (with some previous interpreters) feels that an api is needed after
arthakāmām; but none is at all called for, and those translators who supply api misun-
derstand the meaning. The Kashmirian text reads arthakāmas, a nominative agreeing
with Arjuna; but its version of the line is otherwise obviously corrupt and secondary, as
Schrader himself admits (na tv arthakāmas tu gurūn nihatya; note double tu!), and
there is not the slightest reason to abandon arthakāmān” (Edgerton 1932, 72).
20“With Boehtlingk and Garbe, paramātma is here to be taken as precisely equiva-
lent to atman; Schrader’s objections to this are purely subjective and sufficiently dis-
proved by the parallels which Garbe quotes. The individual self is repeatedly and in all
possible contexts called īśvara, paramātman, and all other epithets which apply to the
Supreme One; the plain fact being that in early Sanskrit texts these terms mean both at
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concepts. The Kashmiri version, parātmasu samā matiḥ, is in itself harmless, but there
is not the slightest reason to suppose that it was more original” (72).
21“I continue to find the doubled iva suspicious” (Schrader 1933, 47).
22“Non liquet” (47).
23“Matan admittedly cannot be thought of as an improvement but certainly as a
corruption such as have often defaced such a completely clear text” (47).
24“There are also other metrical errors to be found in K and might in fact be an
indication of its greater age. But Edgerton rightly points out that samāpnoṣi here (in
contrast to the commentators) can be understood as ‘attain, win’” (47).
25“One has also earlier attempted to help oneself out with irregular sandhi. But I
consider it most improbable that the Gītā would already have applied the image of a
lover and his beloved to God and his devotee” (47).
26“I consider it out of the question that with brahmasūtrāṇi the same thing is
meant here as with vedānteṣu in Mbh. XII, 8971. I have heard Upaniṣads, even the ones
composed in prose, ‘sing’, but never sūtras” (47).
27“Even if Edgerton could cite a text according to which the Brahmans are created
from the syllable om (that this is true of the Vedas is well known), the difficulty would
remain that the following verses by no means fulfill the parallel between om, tat, sat
and Brahmans, Vedas, and sacrifices he supposes, but rather, only connect om, tat, sat
and asat in a vague manner with sacrifices, donations and asceticism, but nowhere con-
nect either om nor tat nor sat specially with the Brahmans” (47).
28“As before, I am of the same opinion as Schlegel (an opinion also shared by Böh-
tlingk): ‘At, vel sexcentis codicibus repugnantibus, nihilominus contenderem, hunc versum
emendatione egere. Sunt frequentissimae versuum clausulae: iti me matiḥ vel iti matir
mama, sed particular iti nullo modo ab iis abesse potest’. The original text [Urtext] either
had dhruvā iti (K) or the reading dhruvāṇīti [sic] found by Schlegel in two of his manu-
scripts and supported by Rāmāyaṇa II, 20, 29” (47).
29“Edgerton correct: nāyakā (V) more original than nāyakān (K)” (47).
30“A decision is not easy, but Edgerton may be right” (47).
31“Along with Edgerton (Garbe) I now consider the lectio difficilior to be accept-
able, [and] K to be secondary here” (47).
32A splendid example of this is offered by Speyer (1902, 123–25). After noting that
Kṛṣṇa in Bhagavadgītā 2.11 praises Arjuna’s “wisdom,” he asks, “which wisdom [welche
Weisheit]?” (124) and argues that there is no wisdom in the preceding passages that
might justify this interpretation. Native commentators, in fact, had to come up with an
addendum (“you speak words of wisdom, but you are not wise”) to explain this discrep-
ancy (that is, they interpreted Kṛṣṇa’s words ironically). He continues: “there is also, in
addition, a philological obstacle, which, however, the theological-dogmatic exegesis of
the native commentators did not consider very significant,” and then he discourses:
“However, it [the philological obstacle] is there and, when correctly recognized, a sig-
nificant factor for doubting the correctness of the vulgate [text]. I doubt very much
if a composite like prajñāvāda, ‘words of wisdom’ = wise words, wise speech, can
exist in Sanskrit at all. Probably one could say prājñavādaḥ = prājñāṃ (or prājñasya)
vādaḥ but prajñāyā vādaḥ would only be permissible if the prajñā were thought of as a
person. Only an interpretation such as λόγοι τῆς Σοφίας, ‘words spoken by Prajñā’ is
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ered purely philologically, awkward and untenable. It corresponds much rather to the lan-
guage of the Bible and to Latin—verba sapientiae = verba sapientis or sapientium—than to
Sanskrit, where the use of the abstract term to characterize the bearers of the term is un-
known in this dimension” (124–25). After concluding, “in short, prajña is corrupted,”
Speyer instead offered the emendation prajā. He argued that this term better brings out
the contrast between the general opinion and the view of the wise and that its use in
Kṛṣṇa’s speech, where it “has the meaning of pṛthagjana, Greek ἰδιώτης” “indicates the
sensitivity of understanding [Feinheit der Auffassung] of the talented composer of the
Gītā.” “He will probably have placed this prajā Kṛṣṇa in his mouth in order to express
himself as gently as possible vis-à-vis Kṛṣṇa there where he has to reprimand his friend
[that is, Arjuna]; how easily he [that is, the poet] could have said bāla-, ajña-, mūrkha-
vādān bhāṣase” (125).
33As reported by Sauppe (1872, 89).
34See Sauppe (1872, 89): “Not only does he [Heyne] repeatedly describe it as a kind
of vanity of wanting to seem brilliant through emendations, [a kind of vanity] from which
he has freed himself, but the insignificant variants of such ancient witnesses of the trans-
mission as we have them in Virgil in the manuscripts of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries,
which he knows and records, also move him only rarely to make a change to something
once it is present in the editions or to a discussion of the differences in the transmission.”
35In his earliest article on the Bhagavadgītā and the earliest on the topic, Schrader
averred that the “original” Gītā would have only comprised chapter 1 and chapter 2, verses
1–38, that is, a total of eighty-five verses. See Schrader (1910, 336–40). It is not clear whether
Schrader had this figure in mind when he spoke of the “original” in the 1938 article.
36Schrader does not say why exactly these verses must be eliminated; probably he is
deferring to Garbe’s views here, which he cited a little earlier.
37Schrader would regard the fourteen full and four half-verses as being, tenta-
tively, original, remove an unspecified number of verses (y) from these (which
ones, he did not specify), and reconstruct the archetype. In contrast, he would re-
gard all of the additional verses in V (+2) as being interpolations, as they are not
present in K. But this would not be a stemmatic reconstruction: his hypothetical
archetype would be based on a single witness (K) corrected ope ingenii and using
completely arbitrary criteria. Even if we were to get around this problem (for ex-
ample, by admitting that both K and V had been produced through mechanical
transcription of a common source), where K and V give different readings, we
would have a crux. We would have to choose the readings of one based on intrin-
sic grounds, and, since the standard assumption in textual criticism is that scribes
never consciously omit anything (but may add verses of their own), the presump-
tion must be that the additional verses in K are additions in this recension rather
than omissions in the rival recension—a fact both Belvalkar and Edgerton noted.
38For further examples that this is what the Indologists were really doing most of
the time, when they claimed to be engaged in “textual critcism,” see Adluri and Bag-
chee (2014) for examples from Richard Garbe, Hermann Oldenberg, and Georg von
Simson; Adluri and Bagchee (2016a) for examples from Jarl Charpentier, Mislav Ježić,
and Przemysław Szczurek; and Adluri and Bagchee (2016b [In press]) for examples
from Andreas Bigger and Michael Witzel.
Bagchee and Adluri International Journal of Dharma Studies  (2016) 4:4 Page 31 of 4139The simplest way for the fourteen full and four half-verses less y verses not found
in V but found in K' (and of which Schrader claimed that all of them are features of
their common ancestor O) to have descended to K' from O is if O contained 714 full
and four half-verses less y verses. In that case, V would have inherited 700 of those
verses but only K' would have inherited the full complement of verses lost in V. If O
contains only 700 verses and we are to assume with Schrader that the fourteen full and
four half-verses less y verses unique to K' are all original, then an equal number of
verses (that is, fourteen full and four half-verses less y verses) must be eliminated from
both V and K', that is, not all of the 700 verses in V can be original and likewise a corre-
sponding number of the 700 remaining verses in K' must be additions in K'. We might
possibly be able to identify these verses if K' and V differed in respect of these verses,
but since they are in fact identical we must assume that the same verses (and not just
the same number of verses) as were added to V were added to K'. Eliminating them,
then, will become a matter of subjective iudicium and we will be returned to the same
position as the nineteenth-century critics of the Bhagavadgītā such as Richard Garbe
and Hermann Oldenberg, who gaily went through the text and eliminated verses that
seemed unoriginal to them. If, however, O has less than 700 verses, as Schrader’s
argument suggests, then we would not even know how many verses in V and K' are to
be eliminated as additions from them: O might have had any length, even as little as
eighty-five verses (the number Schrader opted for in his 1910 article as being the length
of the “original” Gītā). The only thing that is given here—given not because it is proven
by codicological or philological investigations but because Schrader insists upon it—is
that the fourteen full and four half-verses less y verses of K' are features of the original
O. We do not have much reason for confidence in Schrader’s abilities either as a textual
critic or as a critic of the Bhagavadgītā.
40Something similar applies to Van Buitenen’s attempt to revive Schrader’s ar-
gument for a “K” recension (Van Buitenen 1965, 99–109). Van Buitenen treats
Schrader’s K as a descendant of Bhāskara’s text (denoted by the siglum Bh. in
his—explicit—stemma), Śaṅkara’s and Bhāskara’s texts (the former denoted by Ś) as
apographs of a common source (O), and argues that Bh. must have descended
from a second source (besides the vulgate, that is, the text of the Śāṅkarabhāṣya)
that he had before him, “which must be considered a Vorlage of what now survives
as the Kashmir version” and “is consistently superior to [the] version of the Gītā
now known from Kashmir sources” (104 and 105). (Note that this makes Van Bui-
tenen’s stemma contradictory to what he says of it; but this issue demands a separ-
ate article and we cannot get into it now.) Unfortunately, Van Buitenen has no
way of getting from Bhāskara’s text to the hypothetical ancestor of Śaṅkara’s and
Bhāskara’s texts (which he designates with O), the more so as he considers Bhās-
kara to have had access to and combined readings from two sources (Śaṅkara’s text
and the hypothetical ancestor O). Bhāskara’s text Bh. is playing the same role in
his stemma as Schrader’s hypothetical ancestor of K, K', and the fact that he has a
manuscript source for Bh. only seemingly overcomes the problem of moving from
K to Bh. (or K' as the case may be) because his procedure for establishing the
relationship of Bh. to Ś is faulty: Van Buitenen treats Bh. and Ś as apographs of a
common source, even though he has only examined the first chapter of Bhāskara’s
text against the vulgate and he does not have a first chapter for Śaṅkara’s text to
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mentary). In other words, he enters what are essentially two different works into
the same stemma as though he has been able to establish their relation and this is
because he has treated Śaṅkara’s text as being essentially equivalent to the vulgate
even though he criticizes the editor (that is, Belvalkar) for doing so. It is clear that
the confusion is in Van Buitenen’s own mind: the constituted text is based on the
evidence of the manuscripts and those commentators who did, in fact, comment
on this part of the Gītā. Belvalkar cannot be accused of consituting the first chap-
ter on the basis of Śaṅkara’s commentary because he explicitly notes that “Cś [the
commentary of Śaṅkara] begins from st. 11 of Gītā adhy. 2” (Belvalkar 1947b, 114). The
relationship of Bhāskara’s text to Śaṅkara’s must first be established using those parts for
which both are preserved; only then can Van Buitenen’s inferences regarding their pre-
sumed ancestor be legitimate.
41Tadpatrikar does not mention which these manuscripts are, other than to note
that one is in Śāradā characters and the other in Kashmiri Nāgarī. Belvalkar refers to
them as K1 and Ś (Belvalkar 1939b, 335).
42We are calling the version found in the manuscripts Ś1, K0–2, B2–4, Dn, and
D4.8 (*112 in the Critical Edition) the “vulgate” version of the Gītāmāna śloka. Perhaps
“northern” version might have been more accurate, except for the circumstance that
the two Kashmiri manuscripts mentioned by Tadpatrikar are also northern sources.
43By “testimony” should here be understood not what scholars generally call
“manuscript evidence” for Schrader has not in mind the evidence of its readings but
the fact that a verse either gives or appears to give information about some source (or,
possibly, about the scribe’s own exemplar). It is thus also not what scholars have
termed the “codicological evidence” (Timpanaro calls it the prove materiali or the
“physical evidence”) but a form of hearsay contained in the tradition itself. What exact
weight should be assigned it (and whether it should be assigned a weight at all) is very
much in doubt. Certainly, the two other attempts to account for it, S. K. Belvalkar’s and
S. N. Tadpatrikar’s (1939b and 1937), are not very convincing. Vishnu S. Sukthankar as a
matter of fact thought that no weight should be assigned to such figures (his main ex-
ample was the Parvasaṁgraha figures of the Mahābhārata but the principle applies to all
other such calculations) because of the ease with which “the data of the Parvasaṁgraha
can be manipulated”—“far more easily [at any rate] than those of the manuscripts of the
text” (Sukthankar 1933, xxxiii).
44Note that these sigla differ from those used earlier and refer to the vulgate and
Kashmirian recensions of the Gītā (the earlier ones referred to the vulgate and
Kashmirian versions of the Gītāmāna śloka, that is, not to manuscripts or manuscript
versions but to variants of a specific verse and, still more accurately, to the differing ac-
counts contained in those verses).
45That is, that first the vulgate Gītā was developed from the common archetype of
671 verses by the addition of twenty-seven verses, then the Vaiśaṁpāyana Gītā was
developed from the same ancestor by the addition of seventy verses (though not the
twenty-seven attributed to Arjuna added in the vulgate), and then another two.
46Recall that textual criticism only functions on the basis of the assumption of
mechanical transcription of a single source; if the scribe made conscious changes to his
exemplar, both adding, dropping, and composing new verses, we would have no reason
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tionship through noting the common passages between it and another exemplar such
as the vulgate but note that this would be an exercise in higher criticism. It would
furthermore be subject to a basic objection that arises in relation to all studies in Quel-
lenkritik: rather than being an independent method alongside Textkritik, Quellenkritik
is actually a specific subset of the latter—indeed, an erroneous application or a
malformation of the latter. Quellenkritik attempts to identify the common source of
two texts based on their shared passages but this runs into the fundamental objection
that only shared innovations prove manuscripts related. Two manuscripts that have the
same passages may have both gotten them from a third or from different sources
altogether or one from the other. But without significant errors to connect them and
without an appreciable length of common text containing a significant number of such
errors (this is why textual criticism does not work for very short passages such as might
be quotations of one text in another) we would be unable to establish their
relationship.
47See the editions by Vedavyas (1990) and Bhattacharjya (2013). And see also
Shastri 1941, discussed and already rejected as an apocryphal edition in Belvalkar 1943.
48A similar argument is made by Patrick Olivelle (1998, 173–87).
49The complete extent of his explanations to his reconstruction in his 1930 article
is as follows: “The arrangement of the edition attempted in the following pages requires
just a few remarks. The ‘vulgate’ (V) which I have used as the basis of my comparison
is the text of the Gītā as known to Śaṅkara and his school. My critical apparatus is nat-
urally but small. There is none at all for the first adhyāya, because for it the birch-bark
MS (B) only was available. For adhyāyas II to VIII (exclusive of VIII, 18 ff.) I had the
two commentaries (R, A) and the birch-bark MS, for the rest only the two commentar-
ies, or in the many cases in which A is silent, only R in its twofold form: the text (Rt,
occasionally vitiated by V) and the comment (R) following each verse or group of
verses. For the establishment of the text the commentaries had, of course, to be
decisive: when a reading was found explained (not merely mentioned) in one or both of
them, it was necessarily preferred to a different reading in B or Rt; and in such
cases the latter if agreeing with V, i.e., obviously secondary, was as a rule not
mentioned at all. In many cases where no apparatus is given this means that the
reading concerned is the only one and sufficiently guaranteed. Where R or A or
both of them are not mentioned, though expected (as, e.g., ad VI, 40), they do not
repeat the word or words concerned nor throw any light on them. Differences
between R and A are always noticed; between these (or either) and B, however, as
a rule only when B has not the vulgate reading. Rt is generally not given except
where it disagrees with R (or A, B) otherwise than by agreement with V. The
extracts from the commentaries contain the complete comments on the stanzas or
half-stanzas missing in the vulgate, so far as these are explained at all, and, more-
over, all that is essential in the explanation of the readings peculiar to K. Obvious
clerical errors, inclusive of wrong punctuation, I have silently corrected” (Schrader
1930, 18–19; emphasis in original).
50We have examined P. C. Divanji’s critical apparatus of section B (appendix II) in
the Critical Word Index to the Bhagavadgītā (Divanji 1946). Unfortunately, as those
readings are based on Schrader’s 1930 edition, as well as there being other problems
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too sympathetic toward Schrader’s theories.
51Schrader’s assertion was proved wrong: all of the Kashmiri manuscripts of the
Mahābhārata (specifically of the Bhīṣmaparvan) found turned out to contain the vulgate
version of the Gītā.
52“More than a century has elapsed since (1826), and during it many scholars have
expressed their opinion on the problem with the result that in the West the almost
general opinion is at present that the Gītā cannot have been from the beginning what it
is now. Farthest of all went the late Professor Winternitz who, not satisfied with Garbe’s
deletion of 170 stanzas, refused to recognize as original parts of the Gītā the whole of
the famous eleventh canto as well as the whole of the last six cantos with the sole
exception of XVIII 55–56. The last one who wrote on the problem is the late Profes-
sor Rudolf Otto of Marburg University. He endeavoured to show that the Gītā had
much the same evolution as the Mokṣadharma: as the dying Bhīṣma’s ‘few reconciling
and consolatory speeches,’ which alone could have been part of the epic proper,
became the ‘nest’ of numerous treatises, so the ‘primitive Gītā’ (Urgītā) of 156 verses
gradually grew, first by the intrusion of eight ‘didactic treatises’ (Lehrtraktate) and
then by many ‘glosses,’ the same (with some exceptions) as, and a few more than,
those pointed out by Garbe. His view of canto XI was identical with Humboldt’s,
viz., that it is the very acme of the Gītā, and thus diametrically opposed to that of
Winternitz” (63–64).
53After making such massive and unwarranted incursions into the text, Schrader
rather brazenly accuses the hypothetical “redactor” of the “original” Gītā of a “complete
absence of a sense of propriety (let alone historical sense)” (65, n. 1). We might say the
same thing of him. For more examples of Schrader’s wanton, irresponsible, and partisan
approach to identifying “interpolations” and proposing conjectural “original” readings,
see Schrader 1929a and 1929b.
54On the German scholars’ need to claim a more illustrious predecessor for their
method of “criticism” in Wilhelm von Humboldt, see Adluri and Bagchee (2016a,
285, n. 98).
55See Adluri and Bagchee (2014, chapter 3), and see also Adluri and Bagchee
(2016a).
56An English-language journal founded in Bombay in 1930 and published by the
Theosophy Company. Its editor and board were drawn from Bombay’s elite anglicized
Parsi community.
57And see also Schrader (1936, 107–18) where Schrader bitterly fought out the bat-
tle for authority over the text with the “scholar of religion” Rudolf Otto. In his words,
“it is extremely disconcerting that this ‘Ur-Gītā’ [the reference is to Otto’s reconstructed
text, bearing in mind that not only Schrader himself but also Richard Garbe, Hermann
Jacobi, and Hermann Oldenberg had themselves offered reconstructions of the “ori-
ginal” Gītā; apparently, these posed no problem for Schrader, since they were “indologi-
cally” legitimated], even before critical scholarship [Kritik] could say a word about it,
has been placed before a wide audience. For, first of all, [Otto’s edition] is still lacking
in the foundation on the basis of which such constructions can attain security: the
philological investigation, oriented toward [a knowledge of] grammar, vocabulary, style,
and meter” (112).
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“The traditional extent of the Bhagavadgītā as reported by Śaṅkarācārya is just seven
hundred ślokas or stanzas, and the orthodox Indian Commentators have attempted to
make these seven hundred stanzas (neither more nor less) yield a self-consistent system
of Ethics and Metaphysics. The late Professor R. Garbe and his pupil, the late Professor
Rudolf Otto, essayed to prove the inherent impossibility of such an attempt by drawing
attention to the composite nature of the present Bhagavadgītā. Garbe postulated two
disparate strata in the Poem: Otto was not content with anything less than ten or eight
of them; but neither has, in my opinion, succeeded in proving that the Gītā in its
present form is incapable of being understood as a whole which may allow for the
original divergent thought-phrases (when established as such), and yet transcend them
all in a higher philosophical synthesis. Another German savant, Professor F. Otto
Schrader of Kiel, has attempted to attack the authenticity of the traditional extent of
the Bhagavadgītā from a somewhat different point of view. Schrader tries to show
that the text of the Poem to which the Gītābhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya gave currency
(and consequently the Gītābhāṣya itself ) was completely unknown in Kashmir upto
about 1,000 AD, some two hundred years after the time of the great Bhāṣyakāra. To
persons brought up in the belief that the text of the Bhagavadgītā has remained, like
the Vedas, almost immune from varietas lectionis this would come as a great shock,
particularly if it is claimed, as Schrader in fact claims, that the earlier and hence the
authentic Gītā is that preserved by the Kashmir Recension, and not the one on
which Śaṅkara wrote his Bhāṣya. It is of course not claimed that this ‘Kashmirian’
Bhagavadgītā, from the purely philosophical point of view, differs vitally from
the accepted text; but once Schrader’s thesis is accepted as proved, it raises the possibil-
ity of other recensions of the Poem being current at different times in different parts of
India. All this, once admitted, would go to discountenance the view that the
Bhagavadgītā had a definite philosophical import and so had once constituted an
important landmark in the evolution of Indian Philosophy. Schrader’s thesis is, it
follows, of more far-reaching consequence than would appear at first sight.” (Belvalkar
1939a, 211–13). Schrader was not unaware of the opposition to the fragmentation of the
text in India (see Schrader 1929a, 174: “Still the idea of interpolation in the Gītā must
not, as is often done in India, be ridiculed as the caprice of hypercritical minds”).
59For further examples, see Adluri and Bagchee (2014).
60“Why was it necessary to suppose that ancient works were brought to light,
while at the same time circumstances made it evident that the compositions were
recent, indeed contemporary? What mental process allowed this self-deception to
occur? Firstly as the Sanātana Dharma Dipikā shows, and evidence of the condi-
tions of thought in the 1770’s confirms, Hindu scholarship is wedded to the no-
tion that all authoritative scripture is part legislation and part prophecy and is
located, actually or ideally, in the first years of the Kali-yuga, except for works of
even greater prestige which must be located earlier than all yugas. The concep-
tion that living persons can lay down law, even in committees of public gather-
ings, is foreign to Hindu thought. The converse is obviously correct also. No one
who proposes to persuade others can hope for success unless he shows that what
he teaches is not his own but the common heritage of the race” (Derrett 1977,
180).
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from Mrs. Besant spurious archaeology, fraudulent presentation of scripture, and practical
organization” (178). Thus the problem is a western one in a twofold sense: the impact of
western colonization both created the conditions under which a recourse to traditional
systems became impossible and proffered a solution.
62Derrett offers this summary of the conditions of its production: “The prime movers
of the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala (which survived until as late as 1952) were principally
Sir Subramania, now well over 70 years of age, and a Pandit K. T. Sreenivāsāchāriar of
Madras. It is evident that the former lent his name and did most of the English writing
(which often has a legal flavour) for the Maṇḍala’s series of publications. In more than
one publication, a photograph of Sir Subramania appears, dressed as a sanyāsī, with his
name and titles added, in order to give prestige to this bogus organization. The Sanātana
Dharma Dipikā purports to be a purāṇa. It is full of mock puranic material. In Part I,
chapter 1, sec. 181 we are told that the deity said ‘I will re-establish the organization
named Śuddha dharma-maṇḍala: it is as old as time, excellent and makes its appearance
with each kalpa (era).’At sec. 289 we are told that all people will have one faith, one caste,
in the Kali-yuga (the present age); at sec. 292–94 that all dharmas will be unified. At ch.
2, sec. 76–78 we are told that women will choose their own husbands. Social reform is
evidently within the scope of the spurious literature which is now put forth. In 1918 the
Yoga Dipikā of Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa was published in the same series, purporting to be a
work of the deity, with a commentary by Haṃsa Yogi. In 1922 the Bhagavad Gītā was
published also with the commentary of Haṃsa Yogi, but we are told at p. 7 that Haṃsa
Yogi is not anyone’s name, but the title of an office. Evidently ‘Haṃsa Yogi’ was the Ma-
dras pandit himself. By this time the public is invited to supply money to subsidize the
publication of commentaries on the entire Veda in the sense of the Ś. D. Maṇḍala, and so
the enterprise which had started as an intellectual aberration takes on the form of a crim-
inal conspiracy. The works published were bogus, but presented as if they were genuine.
The author is also non-existent. Religious and social regeneration is the aim, and no doubt
the conspirators were pioneers in some respects, hiding however under the garb of re-
storers of a lost literature” (Derrett 1977, 179).
63For an account of these Gītās, see Adluri and Bagchee (2014, chapter 3). Georg
von Simsons “Brahmanic Gītā” is also covered in this chapter; for Ježić’s “pseudo-Ger-
man Gītā” (see next line of main text), see Adluri and Bagchee (2016a).
64Could Schrader have known that the Haṁsayogin’s Gītā was a forgery? The
evidence of the various forewords and introductions is unambiguous, but, as we have
seen, Schrader chose to neglect these. At any rate, we know that other German
scholars, reading the works of the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala around the same time,
came to radically different conclusions: Wilhelm Printz, for instance, reviewed the pub-
lications of the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala and declared, “what must be understood
under S. Dh. M. is adequately clear from [publication] nr. 5 [An Esoteric Organization in
India], from the texts nr. 2 and 4 [Yoga Deepika of Bhagavan Narayana, and the Com-
mentary of the Hamsa Yogi and Sanatana Dharma Deepika of Bhagavan Hamsa Yogi] as
well as the English introductions: an esoteric organization with a transcendental hierarchy.
The latter has its seat in the northern Himālaya (or, north of the Himālaya) in Badarī-
vana” (Printz 1929, 257). Printz also noted that the founder of the organization was Sir
Subramania Iyer, “K. C. I. E., L. L. D., sometime Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of
Bagchee and Adluri International Journal of Dharma Studies  (2016) 4:4 Page 37 of 41Judicature, Madras, known as a long-term member of the Theosophical Society and
[that] his book (nr. 5) is shot through with comparative references to it [that is,
the Society]” (259). Nor was there any doubt about the identity of the Haṁsayogin:
“About the author and commentator Haṃsayōgin as well we are sufficiently informed. Nr.
4 begins in Purāṇa style with Yōgis seeking the Ṛṣi Haṃsayōgin in Badarī-vana and request-
ing him to present the S. Dh. M. [to the world]. In the foreword to nr. 7 (and similarly in
other places) S. Subrahmanya Iyer clarifies (7) that ‘The name Hamsa Yogi is not the
proper name of any specific writer but the title of an office in the organization, filled, from
time to time, by one or more of the most learned among the members thereof; these
office-holders being charged with the duty of elucidating esoteric teachings contained in
the chief Hindu Sacred books’” (259–60). Printz adds: “Finally, regarding the Bhagavadgītā
we learn from this protagonist [that is, Sir Subramania] in the foreword to nr. 3 right at the
beginning: ‘It is needless to say that none of the verses, in question, are of modern inven-
tion and all of them are to be found in the parent work, the Mahâbhârata, but in parts and
contexts where they should not be. All that has been done is merely to transpose them to
their proper place in this Geeta, thereby making it what it was in the Bhârata of 24,000 ślô-
kas, the predecessor of the epic as we have it now’” (260). Printz was not in any doubt
about the mechanisms of textual production of the Dharma Maṇḍala; he notes that “one
does not need to add a long criticism to the state of affairs described above. It is at any rate
interesting to see how the Theosophic doctrine, which, under Annie Besant and C. W.
Leadbeater, has taken over extensive elements from Tantric teachings of a south Indian na-
ture, has had a reverse effect on a Vaiṣṇava circle, which, of course, has not had any great
success’” (260–61). We can only speculate as to why Schrader so lightly overlooked this
evidence. Perhaps the attractions of announcing a “new” Gītā edition and a previously un-
known “classical” commentator to European audiences were too compelling, or perhaps he
really did take the Haṁsayogin’s historical claims for statements of fact. Then, again, which
we consider most probable, he may have been looking for evidence to make his own claims
about having discovered a “Kashmir recension” of the Bhagavadgītā and that the Bhagavad-
gītā as we have it is not the “original” Gītā more probable. Curiously, in his last article on
the Gītā (Schrader 1938, 62–68), he seems to have realized the deception (“We have, then,
here an attempt to fabricate a Bhagavadgītā conforming to our Mahābhārata passage and
consequently later than it”; 62), but he offers no retraction or, indeed, mention of his earlier
studies, where he had taken the Haṁsayogin’s evidence seriously.
65This is the essence of Biardeau’s objection to critical editions of the epics and
purāṇas (Biardeau 1968, 115–23); a point that V. M. Bedekar in his response (Bedekar
1969, 210–28) unfortunately failed to grasp.
66Compare Schrader’s “Both the commentators, Rāmakaṇṭha as well as Abhinava-
gupta, must have been completely ignorant of what is now the vulgate text of the Bhag-
avadgītā. They could not otherwise (not, at least, Rām, who mentions even variants such
as anantaram for nirantarā XII, 12) have failed to adopt or at least mention some of the
better readings of the vulgate, as, e.g., samaduḥkhasukhaḥ svasthaḥ in XIV, 24 instead of
the nonsensical samaduḥkhasukhasvapnaḥ of the Kashmir text. Nor could they possibly
have not even once mentioned the omission in the vulgate of one of those stanzas which
are found only in the Kashmir text. In this respect it is worthy of note that Abhinavagupta
at least is not afraid to state interpolations; also that Rāmakaṇṭha says (ad XI, 27) that he,
on the strength of his having consulted many manuscripts of the Bhagavadgītā, does not
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nihatā nūman” (Schrader 1930, 7–8; Schrader’s emphasis). And see also Schrader (1933,
42): “It can be considered out of the question that, had the Kashmirian Mahābhār-
ata in Abhinavagupta’s time contained the Bhagavadgītā in the form of the vulgate,
that he [that is, Abhinavagupta] would not have used this as the basis for his com-
mentary or at least would have spoken out against it [that is, the vulgate text].”
67Additionally, Schrader’s comments (see preceding note) bear rich comparison
with the work of David and Nancy Reigle of the Eastern Tradition Research Institute.
Commenting on the historical priority of the texts of the Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala,
they note, “The great sage Gauḍapāda near the beginning of his Māṇḍūkya-kārikā
reviews the various theories of ‘creation,’ or more accurately, manifestation. He
concludes by giving his own view that the svabhāva of the deva, i.e., brahman/ātman,
is the cause of manifestation, in full agreement with the Wisdom Tradition. Yet this is
not the doctrine of the Advaita Vedānta school known today, which was established by
Śaṅkarācārya, his disciple’s disciple. The Śaṅkarācārya known today teaches that the
cause of the world is omniscient, omnipotent brahman as God (īśvara). He goes on to
specifically reject svabhāva, ‘inherent nature,’ as the cause of the world. So virtually all
Vedāntins today accept God, īśvara, rather than svabhāva as the cause of the world.
But the Praṇava-vāda, in agreement with Gauḍapāda, says that manifestation is the
svabhāva or inherent nature of brahman, and that svabhāva is declared everywhere to
be the cause of the world . . . . These few examples are sufficient, I think, to show that
Praṇava-vāda, and presumably other texts brought ought by the Suddha Dharma
Mandala, are in agreement with the hitherto secret teachings brought out in The Secret
Doctrine. Moreover, the last example indicates that they represent a more ancient tradition
than the one currently found in India, as verified by a still extant source, Gauḍapāda”
(Reigle and Reigle 2007, 9–10). Evidently, the contrast between a “scientific domain
[wissenschaftlichen Bereich]” and “esoterica” that some have made (see Hanneder
2008) is insufficient to distinguish these two approaches. German Indology is no less
“esoteric” than Theosophy: both traditions seek to identify more “original,” “secret,” or
“lost” texts; both traditions believe in an esoteric tradition of knowledge, lost or hidden
from the Indians; and both traditions place emphasis on a lineage of teachers, experts,
or initiates, thought to have a mysterious ability to uncannily restore these lost texts. It
is merely a matter of which tradition one professes allegiance to. That is why in the
section above we referred to Otto Schrader and Sir Subramania as the Hamburg yogin
and the Haṁsayogin.
68See Martin Luther, Luthers Sendschreiben vom Dolmetschen (1530).
69Luther’s writings on translation offer eloquent testimony for his views. Under attack
by Catholic theologians for his translation of Romans 3: 28, a passage in which he interpo-
lated the word “alleine” (alone) even though the Greek does not contain it, he typically
did not debate his rivals on the merits, but turned the debate into a question of authority.
He says: “If your papist makes much useless fuss about the word sola, allein, tell him at
once: Doctor Martin Luther will have it so, and says: Papist and donkey are the same
thing; sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas. For we do not want to be pupils and fol-
lowers of the Papists, but their masters and judges; for once, we also want to show off and
spar with the donkey heads; and as Paul boasts before his mad saints, so I will boast be-
fore these donkeys. They are doctors? So am I. They are learned? So am I. They are
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are philosophers? So am I. They are are dialecticians? So am I. They are lecturers? So am
I. They write books? So do I. And I shall further boast: I can expound Psalms and Proph-
ets; which they cannot. I can translate; which they cannot. If these donkeys demand fur-
ther responses to their useless blubbering over sola, then say only so much: Luther wishes
it be so and says, he is a doctor above all doctors in all of the papacy. Therefore the word
allein shall remain in my New Testament, and though all pope-donkeys [Papstesel]
should get furious and foolish, they shall not turn it out.”
70This is something Malinar overlooks, when she claims that, by setting aside the
native commentarial tradition, she avoids the problem of authority. See Angelika
Malinar (1996 and 2007). For, the problem of authority is only sublated and not over-
come: not only does she in her work defer to the authority of the German scholars
Richard von Garbe, Hermann Jacobi, Rudolf Otto, Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, and Heinrich
von Stietencron, and so on, but she also seeks to constitute herself as a new authority.
Her work can at most be taken to be a rejection of traditional authority not a rejection
of the principle of authority tout court.
71See V. S. Sukthankar’s comments in Sukthankar 1933: “We in the present century
are apt to get nervous and irritable over misprints and variae lectiones. But an ancient
Indian scribe, redactor or even commentator, not to speak of the common reciter
(pāṭhaka)—if I read aright Indian literary history—was not perturbed in the least by a little
difference in wording or in sequence, especially if the variant did not give an appreciably
better, or appreciably worse sense” (lv). We must remember that the fetishism of the vari-
ant is a characteristically modern event, introduced by the forgetting of the urgent existen-
tial task.
72Pasquali (1952, 8), cited and translated in Timpanaro (2005, 58).
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